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“AN ANESTHESIOLOGIST, A BRAIN SURGEON, AND A 
NURSE WALK INTO A BAR . . .” : A CALL FOR CHANGE IN 
HOW AMERICA HANDLES HEALTH CARE WORKER 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
Angelica Halat* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
President Richard Nixon waged the War on Drugs in 1971.1  Forty 
years later, the war continues, but the arena has evolved—the 
battlefield, once confined to streets, jails, and disreputable nightclubs, 
now includes the workplace.  Since the introduction of President 
Reagan’s Drug-Free Federal Workplace Act of 1986,2 public and private 
employers have been subjecting seasonal clerical assistants, 
commercial aircraft pilots, and countless workers in between to drug 
and alcohol testing as a condition of employment.  In fact, American 
employees have become so accustomed to the practice that it is now as 
commonplace as filling out the job application itself.3  It is surprising, 
then, that a country so quick to administer drug tests leaves out the 
one group of professionals that we, quite literally, entrust with our 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2013, Lehigh 
University.  Thank you to Dean Charles Sullivan and my fellow Seton Hall Law Review 
editors for their help and guidance throughout the writing of this Comment.  I also 
extend my thanks to my friends and family for their continued love and support.  
 1  Ed Vulliamy, Nixon’s ‘War on Drugs’ Began 40 Years Ago, and the Battle is Still 
Raging, THE GUARDIAN (July 23, 2011, 7:07 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
society/2011/jul/24/war-on-drugs-40-years.   
 2  Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32889 (Sept. 15, 1986), 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12564.html.  
The Act required federal employees to refrain from using illegal drugs and directed 
executive agencies to create and implement a plan to ensure a drug-free workplace.  It 
also authorized each agency to create a drug testing program for “employees in 
sensitive positions” based on a reasonable suspicion, following an accident, and as part 
of, or following, rehabilitative treatment.  Id. § 3(a).  
 3  M. R. Levine & W. P. Rennie, Pre-Employment Urine Drug Testing of Hospital 
Employees: Future Questions and Review of Current Literature, OCCUP. ENVIRON. MED., Apr. 
2004, at 318, 318, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1740763/ 
pdf/v061p00318.pdf  (discussing how common workplace drug testing has become in 
America, and noting that “more than 90% of US companies with over 500 employees 
have some sort of drug screening programme in place”).  
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lives: health care workers. 
For years, voices from all sectors of society, including the medical 
field itself,4 have pushed for the testing of health care workers.  These 
calls for help have even motivated legislative attempts to mandate 
testing.  In 2013, a group of New Hampshire State Representatives 
introduced HB-597 to require health care facilities to randomly test all 
health care employees at least four times per year.5  The story of David 
Kwiatkowski, a hospital technician, represents the most drastic flaws in 
how our current health care system handles drug and alcohol abuse by 
physicians,6 and spurred lawmakers to propose the bill.7  After 
Kwiatkowski infected thirty-two people in New Hampshire with 
Hepatitis-C in the course of feeding his addiction,8 the New Hampshire 
Legislature attempted to nudge the medical field in the right direction 
by introducing a bill that would have required hospitals to enact and 
implement random drug testing policies.9 
On the other side of the country, California’s Proposition 46 
made headlines as potentially the first law to mandate random drug 
and alcohol testing for state-licensed physicians.10  The testing 
provision, part of a broader effort to raise the state’s medical 
malpractice liability cap, proposed to test professionals according to a 
drug testing program used by employers regulated by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT).11  While the proposition failed, 
Californians supported the drug testing portion of Proposition 46 both 
 
 4  See, e.g., Arthur L. Caplan, Doctors and Nurses Should Be Drug-Tested—Get Used to 
It, MEDSCAPE (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/808385.  
 5  H.B. 597, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2013) [hereinafter HB-597]. 
 6  Mark A. Abramson et al., Exposing The ‘Dirty Little Secret’: Random Drug Testing of 
Health Care Workers in the Wake of the Hepatitis C Outbreak, NEW HAMPSHIRE BAR J., 
Spring/Summer 2014, at 10. 
 7  Aaron Sanborn, Random Drug Testing Taken Out of Hepatitis C Bill, 
SEACOASTONLINE.COM (Nov. 5, 2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.seacoastonline.com/ 
article/20131105/News/311050336.  
 8  Abramson et al., supra note 6 (explaining that Kwiatkowski, fueled by his 
fentanyl addiction, would inject himself with the fentanyl meant for patients, refill the 
used syringes with saline, and then leave the syringes to be used on patients later).  
 9  HB-597, supra note 5.  Although New Hampshire successfully enacted 
legislation mandating that hospitals create drug testing policies, the statute does not 
require random drug testing, as HB-597 did.  See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:41 
(LexisNexis 2015). 
 10  SEC’Y OF STATE OF CAL., TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS 46 (2014), 
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/pdf/text-of-proposed-laws1.pdf#prop46 
[hereinafter Proposition 46]; California Proposition 46, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits Cap 
and Drug Testing of Doctors (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/California_ 
Proposition_46,_Medical_Malpractice_Lawsuits_Cap_and_Drug_Testing_of_Doctors
_(2014) (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). 
 11  Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.10; see 49 C.F.R. § 40 (2016).  
HALAT (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2016  12:55 PM 
2016] COMMENT 941 
before12 and after the November elections,13 although many fiercely 
debated its constitutionality.  For example, Natasha Minsker, the 
Associate Director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern 
California, argued that the testing program was unconstitutional and 
went “too far” by threatening to take away a doctor’s medical license 
for failing a test.14  On the other hand, advocacy group Consumer 
Watchdog argued that doctors are within the class of employees that 
may constitutionally be tested,15 and that Proposition 46 is a 
constitutional method of doing so.16 
After its turn at the polls in November 2014, Proposition 46 failed 
to become law, with sixty-seven percent of voters opposing it.17  Still, 
many believe the testing policy itself was not to blame: the chief 
executive of the California Medical Association, Dustin Corcoran, who 
also served as the chairman of the campaign against the initiative, 
stated of its failure: “in this health care environment, undermining 
California’s long-standing malpractice cap is a political poison pill.”18  
Further, because the testing mandate was allegedly included in the 
 
 12  Press Release, University of Southern California, USC Dornsife/L.A. Times Poll: 
Support for Prop. 46 Drops Steeply as Voters Hear Initiative Details (Sept. 15, 2014), 
https://pressroom.usc.edu/usc-dornsifela-times-poll-support-for-prop-46-drops-
steeply-as-voters-hear-initiative-details/ [hereinafter USC Press Release] (explaining 
that a September 2014 poll conducted by USC Dornsife and the Los Angeles Times 
revealed that Proposition 46’s testing mandate was the most popular of the suggested 
measures, with seventy percent of those polled in support of the idea).  
 13  Chris Kardish, California Won’t Drug Test Doctors, GOVERNING (Nov. 5, 2014), 
http://www.governing.com/topics/elections/gov-california-medical-malpractice-
doctors-drug-testing-ballot.html (reporting that while they disagreed with the 
proposition as written, “[t]he American Civil Liberties Union and California’s biggest 
doctor lobby didn’t completely dismiss the idea of drug testing doctors”).   
 14  Christopher Cadelago, Doctor Drug Testing Latest Front in Medical Malpractice 
Measure, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 21, 2014, 9:16 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/ 
politics-government/election/article2607425.html; Sam Levin, The Poison Pill of 
Proposition 46?, EAST BAY EXPRESS (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/ 
oakland/the-poison-pill-of-proposition-46/Content?oid=4079871.  
 15  Press Release, Consumer Watchdog, Consumer Watchdog Campaign: Prop 46 
Author Calls on ACLU to Explain Why It Says Doctors Are Not in Safety Sensitive 
Positions & Should Not Be Tested (Aug. 26, 2014), 
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/newsrelease/consumer-watchdog-campaign-
prop-46-author-calls-aclu-explain-why-it-says-doctors-are-not. 
 16  Cadelago, supra note 14.  
 17  Michael F. Haverluck, Did CA Keep Costs Low by Voting Down Raising Malpractice 
Cap?, ONENEWSNOW (Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.onenewsnow.com/legal-
courts/2014/11/15/did-ca-keep-costs-low-by-voting-down-raising-malpractice-
cap#.VKAm8DDDs.  
 18  Michael R. Blood, Attempt to Raise Medical Malpractice Cap Defeated, WASH. TIMES 
(Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/nov/5/initiative-
would-raise-medical-malpractice-cap/?page=all.   
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initiative as a “‘sweetener’ designed to get voters to approve raising 
[Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act] caps, which would be less 
likely to win on its own,”19 it is difficult to ascertain how many voters 
actually supported the testing provision itself. 
On the other hand, it is quite clear that drug testing was the 
problem in New Hampshire’s HB-597, which originally called for the 
random testing of every health care worker in the state at least four 
times per year.20  The state legislators ultimately decided to replace the 
random test provision with a more politically pleasing substitute: 
testing based on the nebulous “reasonable suspicion.”21  Based on these 
legislative calls for change, as well as the support from various sectors, 
it seems as though the idea of drug testing physicians in fact carries 
much weight.  The question, then, is: why have we not yet implemented 
a program to drug test health care workers?  Opponents claim that 
drug testing is ineffective and invades personal privacy,22 but those 
arguments would also seem to apply to pilots, teachers, and clerical 
assistants, all of whom are subject to testing.23 
Opposition to drug testing largely relies on constitutional, ethical, 
and financial arguments.  The constitutionality of drug testing 
physicians, however, is no different than the constitutionality of drug 
testing other employees carrying out safety-sensitive tasks.  If it is 
ethically acceptable to test bus drivers24 despite the supposed flaws in 
drug testing,25 it is undoubtedly just as acceptable to test health care 
workers for drug and/or alcohol impairment.  Additionally, while drug 
testing may increase operating expenses for medical professionals, 
testing is worth the added cost for two reasons: not only is testing 
 
 19  Yul D. Ejnes, California’s Proposition 46 and Mandatory Physician Drug Testing: A 
Cause for Concern, ANNALS INTERNAL MED., Dec. 16, 2014, at 911, 911.  
 20  HB-597, supra note 5; see also Sanborn, supra note 7 (explaining that since its 
introduction, organizations such as the New Hampshire Association of Counties 
opposed HB-597 because “mandatory random drug testing would have a significant 
cost to the state’s [eleven] nursing homes and three assisted-living facilities”).  
 21  Abramson et al., supra note 6, at 14; see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:41 
(LexisNexis 2015).  Based on the elimination of the random testing provision, it seems 
that HB-597 was also a victim of politics.  
 22 See Brandon Cohen, Drug-Test Physicians? Docs Say ‘No Way’, MEDSCAPE (Aug. 26, 
2014), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/830211.  
 23  See infra Part IV. 
 24  49 C.F.R. § 382.103(a) (2016) (explaining that all “persons who operate a 
commercial motor vehicle in commerce in any State” are subject to drug testing).  
 25  Kristina Fiore, APA: Drug Test Results Often Flawed, MEDPAGE TODAY (May 23, 
2010), http://www.medpagetoday.com/MeetingCoverage/APA/20253 (noting that 
one in twenty patients will receive an inaccurate drug test result, which is more likely 
to be a false positive than a false negative). 
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estimated to eventually decrease health care spending,26 but it also 
helps to ensure the safety of the doctor-visiting public.27 
Despite the logic behind drug testing medical professionals, calls 
to implement such testing, especially on a random basis, repeatedly fail 
in the political arena.28  Accordingly, to finally pass state-mandated 
testing for chemical impairment into law, a testing policy that is 
appropriately tailored to the medical field is necessary.  This Comment 
will discuss the guideposts that belong in a model state statute to 
provide for the testing of health care workers. 
Part II of this Comment will explain the origins and proposed 
measures of California’s Proposition 46 and New Hampshire’s HB-597, 
as well as the reasons why they were rejected and limited, respectively.  
Part III expounds on the need to test health care workers (HCWs)29 
based on recent data brought to light by the debates surrounding 
Proposition 46.  Part IV will explain the constitutional framework for 
drug testing set forth in United States Supreme Court precedent, and 
Part V will employ that framework to demonstrate that HCWs are an 
appropriate class of employees to test for impairment, such that testing 
would be a reasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Part VI will set forth guideposts to include in drug testing 
legislation that is appropriately tailored to the medical field, taking 
into account the shortcomings of Proposition 46 and the original HB-
597, the profession’s self-regulation, and the consequences of relying 
 
 26  CAL. ATTORNEY GEN., PROPOSITION 46, ANALYSIS BY THE LEG. ANALYST 31, 
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/pdf/proposition-46-title-summary-
analysis.pdf (reporting the findings of an analyst retained by the state of California to 
assess the effects of Proposition 46, which revealed that random testing would deter 
physicians from substance use while on duty, leading to fewer medical errors and, thus, 
a decrease in overall health care spending); see also Michael R. Oreskovich et al., 
Prevalence of Alcohol Use Disorders Among American Surgeons, ARCH. SURG., Feb. 2012, at 
168, 17071 (explaining that, according to a study, testing might reduce malpractice 
litigation because “[s]urgeons with alcohol abuse or dependence constituted 77.7% of 
surgeons reporting a medical error in the previous 3 months,” which “suggest[s] a 
potential relationship [between alcohol abuse or dependence and] quality of care”).  
 27  It follows that if testing decreases the amount of medical errors, hospitals 
and/or doctors would be sued less frequently, avoiding litigation costs and providing 
patients with a safer and healthier supply of medical professionals.   
 28  See discussion infra Parts II.B & II.D.  
 29  This Comment proposes guideposts for drug testing all “health care workers,” 
a group that includes any professional who treats, or assists in the treatment of, a 
patient in any way and any professional with access to drugs in a medical setting.  See 
Occupational Outlook Handbook: Healthcare Occupations, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/healthcare/ 
home.htm.  For example, a phlebotomist and a pharmacist would be within the “HCW” 
category for purposes of this Comment, while a dietitian would not.  Id.  
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on a drug test alone to ensure patient safety.  Part VII examines the 
unintended consequences of drug testing HCWs and rebuts the 
common oppositions to testing.  Finally, Part VIII will conclude the 
Comment, demonstrating that the need for drug testing in the medical 
field far outweighs the negative consequences and costs. 
II. THE TROY AND ALANA PACK PATIENT SAFETY ACT AND NEW 
HAMPSHIRE HB-597 
Proposition 46, entitled the Pack Patient Safety Act (PPSA), and 
HB-597 were two attempts to effect change in the regulation of the 
medical field by calling for the random drug and alcohol testing of 
physicians.  Although the bills differed in their details, they are similar 
in that they were reactions to tragic incidents by impaired doctors, and 
they ultimately could not amass the support to become law. 
A. The Troy and Alana Pack Patient Safety Act: Origins and Proposed 
Measures 
The PPSA was introduced by California resident Bob Pack, who 
began his fight against medical negligence when his two children were 
struck and killed by a driver who was under the influence of alcohol 
and drugs—drugs that had been prescribed to her by six different 
doctors working within the same hospital.30  The physicians failed to 
check the state’s prescription drug monitoring system, called the 
Controlled Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System 
(CURES), prior to prescribing painkillers to the driver, Jimena 
Barreto.31 
What looked like a clear case of medical malpractice was not as 
helpful as might appear—under California’s Medical Injury 
Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), the Packs would be limited to an 
award of $250,000 for the loss of their children after a successful suit 
against the doctors for their negligence.32  Dissatisfied with the 
remedies available to those suffering such losses, Mr. Pack introduced 
 
 30  New Measure Would Require Drug Testing for Doctors, ABC 7 NEWS (May 16, 2014), 
http://abc7news.com/news/new-measure-would-require-drug-testing-for-
doctors/64182/.  
 31  Lisa Girion & Scott Glover, Reckless Doctors Go Unchecked, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 30, 
2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/30/local/la-me-prescription-cures-
20121230.   
 32  Nanette Miranda, Father Working to Change Law on Medical Malpractice Lawsuits, 
ABC 7 NEWS (Aug. 16, 2013), http://abclocal.go.com/story?section=news/ 
politics&id=9209527 (explaining that MICRA has not been adjusted for inflation since 
its passage in 1975, which would today amount to $1.1 million); see also Proposition 46, 
supra note 10, at sec. 2.  
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the PPSA in 2013 in an effort to require doctors to use CURES to 
prevent patients from “doctor shopping” as Barretto had, and to raise 
the cap on medical malpractice damages in the event that the system 
once again failed to prevent such a catastrophe.33 
For purposes of this Comment, the most important provision in 
the PPSA is the statewide drug and alcohol testing of physicians with 
admitting privileges,34 a group with a recognized substance abuse 
problem.35  In fact, in a March 2000 report, the Medical Board of 
California (the “California Board”) announced that eighteen percent 
of Californian physicians “may abuse alcohol or drugs during their 
lifetime.”36  Since 2003, the California Board has disciplined 326 
physicians for drug or alcohol abuse,37 imposing sanctions in forty-six 
such cases between 2012 and 2013 alone.38  In addition, unlike most 
states, California does not offer its physicians a “bypass rehabilitation 
program,” through which doctors can avoid disciplinary action if they 
comply with treatment and practice restrictions.39  California shut 
down its program in 2008 after finding that it “permitt[ed] impaired 
physicians to continue to practice” and was not “effective in adequately 
protecting patients from substandard care.”40 
 
 33  See Press Release, Consumer Watchdog, Consumer Watchdog Campaign: Prop 
46 Requiring Physicians to Check Statewide Prescription Drug Database Can Save Up 
to $406 Million Annually (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/ 
newsrelease/consumer-watchdog-campaign-prop-46-requiring-physicians-check-
statewide-prescription-dru; see also Miranda, supra note 32. 
 34  Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.25(a), (a)(1) (providing that 
“hospitals shall conduct testing . . . on physicians who are employees or contractors or 
who have the privilege to admit patients,” covering nearly the whole spectrum of 
physicians practicing within a hospital).   
 35  Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 2 (citing studies from the Annals of Internal 
Medicine, which reveal that “at least one in ten physicians suffers from drug or alcohol 
abuse during his or her career” and that one-third of physicians will experience a 
condition, such as substance abuse, that will affect the safety of their practice).  
 36  MED. BD. OF CAL., PHYSICIAN DIVERSION PROGRAM 6 (2000), 
http://www.protectconsumerjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/MBC.pdf.  
 37  Press Release, Consumer Watchdog, Consumer Watchdog Campaign: Dr. 
Stephen Loyd, Who Survived Substance Abuse, Warns of Undetected Physician 
Impairment and Says New Ad Against Prop. 46 Will “Cost People Their Lives” (Oct. 6, 
2014), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/newsrelease/consumer-watchdog-
campaign-dr-stephen-loyd-who-survived-substance-abuse-warns-undetected.  
 38 MED. BD. OF CAL., 2012–2013 ANNUAL REPORT, at vii (2013), 
http://www.mbc.ca.gov/Publications/Annual_Reports/annual_report_2012-
2013.pdf.  
 39  Keith H. Berge et al., Chemical Dependency and the Physician, MAYO CLINIC 
PROCEEDINGS, July 2009, at 625, 630, http://www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/ 
article/S0025-6196%2811%2960751-9/pdf. 
 40  Id.; see also Peter Eisler, Doctors, Medical Staff on Drugs Put Patients at Risk, USA 
TODAY (Apr. 17, 2014, 5:08 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/ 
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To implement the testing program, the PPSA would have adopted 
the guidelines used by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),41 
which govern the drug and alcohol workplace policies for pilots, air 
traffic controllers, and other employees working on or near aircrafts.42 
While the PPSA cross-referenced the FAA policy,43 it specifically 
enumerated key features of its proposed program in the text of the 
initiative itself, the most controversial of which targeted testing.44  
Under the PPSA, the California Board would have required doctors to 
be tested after an “adverse event,” such as performing an incorrect 
procedure on a patient, prescribing the wrong medication, or 
engaging in other similar events as listed in Section 1279.1 of the 
California Health and Safety Code.45  The Act required that within 
twelve hours of learning of the event, the physician that treated the 
patient or prescribed him medication during the twenty-four hours 
preceding the incident, report to a hospital for testing, for which he 
must pay out of his own pocket.46  Upon a physician’s failure to appear 
for testing or refusal to provide a sample, the Attorney General’s 
Health Quality Enforcement Section would have immediately 
suspended him pending an investigation and notified his employer of 
both the suspension and investigation.47 
Finally, the PPSA would have tested doctors on the basis of 
referrals by colleagues and supervisors upon a reasonable suspicion of 
drug or alcohol use or impairment.48  This objective was problematic 
due to the medical profession’s notorious culture of silence,49 but the 
 
2014/04/15/doctors-addicted-drugs-health-care-diversion/7588401/.  
 41  Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.10 (proposing that physicians be 
tested according to 49 C.F.R. § 40, the testing procedure utilized by the Department 
of Transportation (DOT)); see also 49 C.F.R. § 40 (2016).  The FAA is regulated by the 
DOT, so its policy largely mirrors the DOT guidelines but includes provisions tailored 
for aviation employees.  14 C.F.R. § 120 (2016).  
 42  49 C.F.R. § 40; 14 C.F.R. § 120. 
 43  Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.10.  
 44  Id. at sec. 4.  
 45  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1279.1(b)(1)(C), (b)(4)(A) (Deering 2016).  
 46  Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.25(a)(2), (b).  
 47  Id. at sec. 4 § 2350.30; see also Eisler, supra note 40 (highlighting the difficulty in 
identifying substance abuse within the medical field and noting that disciplinary 
action, “such as suspension of a license to practice, is rare and often doesn’t occur 
until a practitioner has committed multiple transgressions”).   
 48  Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.25(a)(3).  
 49  Many sources have discussed the unwillingness of HCWs to report an 
intoxicated colleague.  See Eisler, supra note 40 (stating that despite the numerous 
times David Kwiatkowski was caught unconscious at work near an empty syringe or 
running to the bathroom in the middle of a procedure to tend to his addiction, his 
colleagues never took any action); Carla K. Johnson, Many Docs Don’t Blow Whistle on 
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PPSA aimed to break down such barriers by mandating that physicians 
come forward when they believe a colleague may be, or may have been, 
impaired by drugs or alcohol while working.50 
The DOT testing guidelines underlie the FAA regulations and call 
for the testing, and confirmatory testing, of an employee’s breath and 
urine samples.51  If the second test reveals a negative result, the 
laboratory considers both results as negative, and the matter is 
concluded.52  If the test result is positive, the HCW may provide a legal 
explanation for the presence of the drug.53  If he is unable to do so, his 
results are forwarded to the California Board, triggering the same 
disciplinary procedures that follow a failure or refusal to test.54  Like 
the FAA guidelines,55 the PPSA suggested testing for the presence of 
“marijuana metabolites, cocaine metabolites, amphetamines, opiate 
metabolites, and phencyclidine.”56 
 
Colleagues, HUFFINGTON POST (July 14, 2010, 11:05 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/14/many-docs-dont-blow-
whist_n_645703.html (reporting that seventeen percent of doctors surveyed by the 
Harvard Medical School had “direct, personal knowledge” of a doctor who had been 
working while “impaired or incompetent,” yet one-third had not reported their 
colleague).  
 50  Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.20.  The PPSA did not specify the 
consequences for a failure to report a colleague.  Id.  It would, however, have imposed 
a statutory duty upon Californian doctors to report an impaired colleague, which they 
are not otherwise required to do.  See Frequently Asked QuestionsComplaint Review 
Process, MED. BD. OF CAL., http://www.mbc.ca.gov/Consumers/Complaints/ 
Complaints_FAQ/Complaint_Process_FAQ.aspx (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) 
(explaining that physicians are not statutorily obligated to report an impaired 
colleague pursuant to the Medical Practice Act, but are encouraged by the California 
Board to do so); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 805(b) (Deering 2016) (mandating 
only that the chief of staff of a peer review body or the chief executive officer of a 
medical facility file a report with the Medical Board of California upon a final decision 
on disciplinary action as to an employee).  
 51  See 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.251 (for alcohol), 40.87 (for drugs) (2016); see also 
Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.15(g) (providing for confirmatory testing 
of samples).  
 52  See 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.255 (for alcohol), 40.87 (for drugs).  
 53  49 C.F.R. § 40.141; see also Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.15(g) 
(providing doctors a chance to explain a positive test result).  
 54  Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.30 (requiring doctors to report 
any verified positive results, willful failures, or refusals to test to the Medical Board and 
enumerating the consequences of a positive result or a failure or refusal to test).   
 55  U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT DRUG TESTING: ON AND AFTER OCTOBER 1, 
2010STILL A 5-PANEL, http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/Part% 
2040DOT5-PanelNotice_0.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).  
 56  Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.15(d); but see Medical Professional, 
LABCORP, https://www.labcorp.com/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy 
8xBz9CP0os_hACzO_QCM_IwN3dyNXAyNjQ2MvHxcXYwNjM6B8JJK8hVGoBVDeN
cjZ0MTXwMDdmIBuP4_83FT9gtyIcgBVIMyI/dl2/d1/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS9ZQnB3Lz
ZfUTg2TlEyTjIwR0cyRTAyMzEzSkxERDMwVDM!/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) 
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B. The Pack Patient Safety Act: What Went Wrong? 
The University of Southern California Dornsife and the Los 
Angeles Times, in a September 2014 poll, revealed that seventy percent 
of people supported the PPSA’s testing mandate.57  By Election Day, 
Proposition 46 proponents, comprised mostly of lawyers’ and 
consumers’ groups,58 amassed $12.4 million in support of the PPSA.59  
Other supporters included Democratic Party leaders and public safety 
and consumer advocates, such as Erin Brockovich and the founder of 
Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Candace Lightner.60 
Conversely, PPSA opponents raised $57.8 million to combat the 
initiative,61 with the majority of the funds coming “from three medical 
malpractice insurers—the Cooperative of American Physicians, the 
Doctors Company and NORCAL Mutual Insurance Company,” each 
contributing at least $10 million.62  Other opponents included medical 
groups, labor unions, and civil liberties groups.63  With over four times 
as much money as the proponents, the anti-PPSA campaign succeeded 
in reaching voters via “a cascade of negative advertising” to drive home 
the message that the PPSA “would send medical costs soaring and drive 
doctors from the state.”64 
Although the post-election analyses are not clear on exactly what 
influenced voters, the late addition of the testing mandate to the 
initiative and the heavy campaigning by medical insurance groups 
suggest that most opponents were moved more by a desire to prevent 
the increase of the medical malpractice cap than the testing mandate.65  
 
(offering a customizable drug test for HCWs based on the drugs available in the 
employer’s workplace); Medical Professional Panels, QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, 
http://blog.employersolutions.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/MedPro-
Final.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) (same).   
 57  USC Press Release, supra note 12.  
 58  BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 10.  
 59  Haverluck, supra note 17.   
 60  BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 10.  
 61  Haverluck, supra note 17.  
 62  Melanie Mason, Poll: Weak Support for Prop. 46 Targeting Medical Malpractice, L.A. 
TIMES (Sept. 13, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-pol-
poll-malpractice-20140913-story.html#page=1.  
 63  BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 10.  
 64  Voters Turn Down Proposition 46 To Lift Medical Malpractice Cap, Require Drug Tests 
For Doctors, CBS SF BAY AREA (Nov. 4, 2014, 11:20 PM), 
http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/11/04/proposition-46-doctors-drug-tests-
results/.  
 65  Adam Nagourney, California Asks: Should Doctors Face Drug Tests?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/us/california-asks-should-
doctors-face-drug-tests.html?_r=0 (explaining that the testing provision was added to 
the initiative to gain support for the PPSA’s main goal of raising the medical 
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In fact, a few doctors and insurance group representatives have 
candidly said just that.66  Accordingly, it appears that Californians are 
largely receptive to the idea of state-mandated drug and alcohol testing 
of physicians.67 
C. New Hampshire’s HB-597: Origins and Measures 
In 2012, thirty-two patients of the cardiac catheterization lab at 
New Hampshire’s Exeter Hospital were diagnosed with Hepatitis C.68  
The diagnoses surfaced after the hospital caught onto the antics of 
medical technician David Kwiatkowski, a fentanyl addict who bounced 
from hospital to hospital for nearly a decade, diverting drugs from 
each facility until his superiors discovered his addiction and asked him 
to leave.69  Kwiatkowski worked in numerous hospitals across eight 
states, sometimes being fired less than two weeks into an assignment.70  
Although his employers had their suspicions, only one filed a 
complaint with the American Registry of Radiologic Technicians 
(ARRT), the national organization responsible for credentialing 
technicians and ensuring their adherence to industry ethical 
standards.71  Ultimately, even the AART’s investigation met a dead-end, 
and Kwiatkowski eventually found himself in New Hampshire’s Exeter 
Hospital on a temporary assignment, thanks to his staffing agency.72  
Despite staff misgivings and resistance, Exeter hired Kwiatkowski as a 
full-time employee.73 
One year later, an investigation into the Hepatitis C outbreak 
among the hospital’s patients revealed that thirty-two patients had 
contracted the disease as a result of contaminated syringes: 
Kwiatkowski had been injecting himself with the patients’ fentanyl and 
 
malpractice cap). 
 66  Bob Egelko, High-Impact Details in Initiative Aimed at Doctors, SFGATE (Oct. 30, 
2013, 7:47 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/High-impact-details-in-
initiative-aimed-at-doctors-4940955.php (quoting Molly Weedn, California Medical 
Association spokeswoman, as saying that PPSA’s CURES and testing provisions were 
“nothing more than window dressing”).  
 67  USC Press Release, supra note 12 (indicating that seventy percent of 
respondents favored the testing mandate, and forty-six percent of voters opposed 
increasing the medical malpractice cap). 
 68  Abramson et al., supra note 6. 
 69  Id. at 10, 11–12.  
 70  Id. at 11–12 (explaining that Kwiatkowski was found unresponsive in a 
bathroom at work after overdosing on fentanyl merely two weeks into his assignment 
at Arizona Heart Hospital).  
 71  Id.   
 72  Id. at 12. 
 73  Id. 
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replacing the used syringes with saline, knowing that they would soon 
be used on the patients.74  Consequently, in 2013, New Hampshire 
State Representatives introduced HB-597 to require state-licensed 
facilities to create a testing program to randomly test each HCW at least 
four times per year; if a facility failed to test, its license with the state 
would be suspended.75 
D. HB-597: What Went Wrong? 
HB-597, entitled “An Act Relative to a Drug-Free Workplace for 
Licensed Health Care Facilities and Providers,” had some support due 
to the success of drug testing programs in the anesthesiology 
departments of two out-of-state hospitals.76  Unfortunately, the New 
Hampshire Legislature diluted the bill before its passage, with the final 
version only requiring “health facilities to adopt policies permitting 
suspicion-based drug testing.”77  The main reason for HB-597’s change 
in testing policy was cost: John Poirier, the president of New 
Hampshire’s Health Care Association, claimed it would cost $2.6 
million per year to test all 15,000 of the state’s HCWs.78  Proponents of 
the original measure argued, however, that the change essentially 
gutted the bill, especially since most hospitals, like Exeter Hospital, 
already had suspicion-based testing policies in place before HB-597 was 
passed.79 
III. THE NEED TO RUN TESTS ON OUR DOCTORS 
Despite its political unpopularity, data largely supports the idea of 
drug testing HCWs.  According to a 2010 study, “[t]he rate of addiction 
among practicing physicians is estimated to be between 10% and 12%, 
the same as or slightly higher than the rate in the general population,” 
with alcohol being the drug of choice in almost half of all HCW 
substance abuse cases.80  Another study, published in the American 
 
 74  Abramson et al., supra note 6.  
 75  Id. at 13.  
 76  Id.  
 77  Id. at 14.  
 78  Id.  
 79  Id. 
 80  Marvin D. Seppala & Keith H. Berge, The Addicted Physician: A Rational Response 
to an Irrational Disease, MINN. MED., Feb. 2010, at 1, https://www.mnhospitals.org/ 
Portals/0/Documents/ptsafety/diversion/the-addicted-physician-a-rational-response-
to-an-irrational-disease.pdf; see also Oreskovich et al., supra note 26, at 170 (discussing 
a survey of 7000 members of the American College of Surgeons, which revealed that 
15.4% of the respondents had responses “consistent with alcohol abuse or 
dependence”).   
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Journal of Medical Sciences, found that “approximately 15% of physicians 
will be impaired at some point in their careers.”81  Furthermore, studies 
have shown that “chemical dependence is considered the most 
common disabling illness” among physicians,82 and that physicians’ use 
of opioids (17.6% of physicians) and of benzodiazepine (11.4%) is 
roughly five times higher than that of the general population.83 
Impaired HCWs can harm patients in a myriad of ways.  To begin 
with the obvious, a chemically impaired doctor operating on a patient 
can seriously injure, or even kill, a patient.  Such is the case with Dr. 
Christopher Duntsch, an alcoholic neurosurgeon from Texas whose 
performance was so horrific that the doctor called in to repair the 
damage caused by Duntsch contacted Duntsch’s medical school to see 
if he had actually graduated.84  Although a former colleague at another 
hospital had already filed a complaint with the Texas Medical Board 
by this time, the bureaucratic entity moved so slowly that Dr. Duntsch 
operated on three more patients at his new hospital, killing one of 
them.85 
Additionally, as was the case in New Hampshire, HCWs can harm 
patients through drug diversion, “the illegal removal of drugs from a 
healthcare facility.”86  Like Kwiatkowski, Kristen Parker infected over a 
dozen patients with Hepatitis C via her contaminated syringes filled 
with saline, while Steven Beumel “infected at least five people with [the 
disease]”—both were sentenced to thirty years in prison for their 
crimes.87 
Further compounding the difficulty in effectively drug testing 
HCWs is the culture of silence that permeates the medical field.  In 
2010, a study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association 
revealed that of the 2000 physicians surveyed, seventeen percent said 
that they had personally known an impaired or incompetent physician 
in the past three years; two-thirds of them did not report their 
colleague to the relevant authority.88 
 
 81  Eugene V. Boisaubin & Ruth E. Levine, Identifying and Assisting the Impaired 
Physician, AM. J. MED. SCI., July 2001, at 31, 31, http://www.ophed.net/system/files/ 
2009/07/impaired-physician-1966-1966.pdf.  
 82  Abramson et al., supra note 6.  
 83  Id.   
 84  Saul Elbein, Anatomy of a Tragedy, TEXAS OBSERVER (Aug. 28, 2013, 2:01 PM), 
http://www.texasobserver.org/anatomy-tragedy/.  
 85  Id.   
 86  Abramson et al., supra note 6. 
 87  Daniel R. Levinson & Erika T. Broadhurst, Opinion, Why Aren’t Doctors Drug 
Tested, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2014, at A27.  
 88  Pee in This Cup, Doc: Random Drug Tests Should Be Standard for Physicians, 
HALAT (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2016  12:55 PM 
952 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:939 
Once again, Mr. Kwiatkowski is a perfect example of this 
unfortunate phenomenon.  Although various health care facilities in 
Michigan fired him for “gross misconduct” and “test[ing] positive for 
controlled substances,” his employers did not even inform his staffing 
agency, let alone the organization that certified him, which allowed 
Kwiatkowski to continue to infect patients in hospitals across the 
country.89  Even when the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center 
finally alerted Kwiatkowski’s staffing agency that it had fired 
Kwiatkowski after finding three empty syringes on his person, a needle 
and an empty syringe in his locker, and fentanyl and opiates in his 
urine, his staffing agency still did not report his conduct to the ARRT; 
the agency instead provided him with another assignment.90  The 
incident at the Arizona Heart Hospital of Phoenix, Arizona finally 
broke the pattern: when Kwiatkowski’s colleagues found him in the 
hospital bathroom after he overdosed on fentanyl just two weeks into 
his assignment, Arizona Heart informed Kwiatkowski’s staffing agency, 
which notified the AART.91  Unfortunately, the AART dropped its 
investigation into the matter when it learned that the Phoenix Police 
Department chose not to press charges against Kwiatkowski.92 
Another example comes from the case of Dr. Duntsch, the Texas 
neurosurgeon.93  As part of the lawsuits filed by his injured patients, 
the plaintiffs alleged that Baylor Regional Medical Center of Plano—
the hospital at which Dr. Duntsch practiced—failed to report him to 
the authorities because it had advanced him $600,000 to join the 
facility after finishing his residency at the University of Tennessee.94  
Thus, the plaintiffs argued, the hospital failed to reveal the doctor’s 
ineptitude because “Baylor had spent a lot of money on Duntsch,” and 
“if he didn’t work, [it] didn’t get paid.”95  The patients also alleged that 
the hospital failed to act after Duntsch “skipped out on five drug tests 
that [it] asked him to take” and instead continued to advertise his 
services to the public.96 
 
SCIENTIFIC AM. (Nov. 1, 2014), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/pee-in-this-
cup-doc-random-drug-tests-should-be-standard-for-physicians/.  
 89  Abramson et al., supra note 6, at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 90  Id.  
 91  Id. at 12.  
 92  Id. at 12.   
 93  See infra text accompanying footnote 84. 
 94  Saul Elbein, Licensed to Kill: Lawsuit Seeks to Overturn Texas Hospital Shield Law, 
THE GUARDIAN (May 2, 2014, 10:04 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2014/may/02/texas-legal-doctor-lawsuit-christopher-duntsch. 
 95  Id.  
 96  Id.  
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Based on the studies revealing substance abuse by physicians and 
the vivid examples of how the culture of silence enabled the deadly 
practices of Mr. Kwiatkowski and Dr. Duntsch, there is a strong need 
to test health care workers for drugs and alcohol. 
IV. TESTING HCWS CONSTITUTES A REASONABLE SEARCH UNDER THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Based on the constitutional framework for drug and alcohol 
testing set forth in United States Supreme Court precedent,97 HCWs 
are in fact an appropriate class of employees to test for impairment.  
Although the problem of workplace intoxication by drugs or alcohol 
has been acknowledged in some industries for over a century,98 it was 
not until the 1980s that a wide cross-section of employers began 
utilizing tests to ensure that employees were not impaired on the job.99  
After the Supreme Court decided the landmark cases of Skinner v. 
Railway Labor Executives’ Association100 and National Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab,101 a framework for analyzing the constitutionality of 
workplace drug testing began to take shape.  The Supreme Court 
refined the test in the late 1990s after handing down Vernonia School 
District 47J v. Acton102 and Chandler v. Miller.103  As a result of these four 
cases, employers ascertained that they could lawfully test their 
employees when a governmental interest in testing, beyond the 
ordinary law enforcement need to collect criminal evidence, is both 
present and sufficiently strong as to outweigh the employee’s interest 
in privacy.104 
Using this framework, employers have implemented, and courts 
have upheld as constitutional, the testing of employees: in “safety-
sensitive” occupations;105 who enjoy a diminished expectation of 
 
 97  See infra Part IV.B. 
 98  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989) (“The problem of 
alcohol use on American railroads is as old as the industry itself, and efforts to deter it 
by carrier rules began at least a century ago.”).  
 99  Id. at 607–08 (explaining that in 1983, the Federal Railroad Administration 
(FRA) promulgated regulations requiring railroads to test pockets of employees after 
finding that industry prohibitions on alcohol were insufficient to address widespread 
drug and alcohol abuse); see also Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32889 (Sept. 
15, 1986), http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/ 
12564.html (establishing a testing policy for all federal employees). 
 100  489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
 101  489 U.S. 656 (1989).  
 102  515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
 103  520 U.S. 305 (1997).   
 104  Id. at 313–14.   
 105  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633. 
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privacy by virtue of working in a highly regulated field;106 and whose 
individual interest in privacy is outweighed by a governmental interest 
in ensuring that they are not impaired while working.107  Classes of 
employees that fall within this framework include teachers,108 trucking 
company drivers,109 and flight attendants.110 
A. Constitutional Rules as Set Forth by the Supreme Court 
1. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association 
Skinner is the first workplace drug testing case that the Supreme 
Court heard and upheld.  After a private railroad implemented a 
testing policy to comply with the regulations enacted by the Federal 
Railroad Administration (FRA), a labor union filed suit to enjoin the 
testing.111  The FRA’s regulations aimed to address the industry-old 
problem of alcohol abuse on the railroad, which had resulted in 
accidents, fatalities, and millions of dollars in property damage.112 
In the event of an “impact accident,” the FRA mandated that 
employers collect and test blood and urine samples from the 
employees “directly involved” in the incident.113  The regulations 
allowed employees an opportunity to explain a positive test before the 
FRA prepared an investigative report and required a nine-month 
suspension of those who refused to provide a sample.114  Lastly, the 
regulations permitted employers to test employees’ breath or urine 
after an accident or safety violation, or based upon a reasonable 
suspicion garnered from “specific, personal observations” that the 
 
 106  Id. at 627.  
 107  Id. at 633.  
 108  Knox Cty. Educ. Ass’n v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 384 (6th Cir. 
1998) (finding that teachers occupy safety-sensitive positions because they monitor 
children entrusted to their care and have immediate impact upon a child’s life).  
 109  Overview of Drug and Alcohol Rules, FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN., 
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/overview-drug-and-alcohol-rules (last updated Apr. 8, 
2015).  
 110  Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451, 457 n.10 (9th Cir. 1990) (opining that “the 
administrative record adequately supports the FAA determination that [flight 
attendant] positions are, in fact, safety-sensitive”).   
 111  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 612.   
 112  Id. at 606–07 (discussing the FRA’s evidence that between 1972 and 1983, more 
than twenty accidents involving “alcohol or drug use as a probable cause or 
contributing factor” and “result[ing] in 25 fatalities, 61 non-fatal injuries, and property 
damage estimated at $19 million (approximately $27 million in 1982 dollars)” had 
occurred on railroads) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 113  Id. at 609.  
 114  Id. at 610–11.   
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employee was impaired on the job.115 
The Supreme Court upheld the testing, establishing first that the 
Fourth Amendment,116 which protects individuals from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, applies to “certain arbitrary and invasive acts by 
officers of the Government” and those “act[ing] as an instrument or 
agent” thereof.117  Accordingly, the private railroad’s search implicated 
the Fourth Amendment because of the degree of governmental 
involvement: the FRA regulations mandated the search, proving the 
government’s “encouragement, endorsement, and participation” of 
the testing.118 
Next, the Court recognized the blood, breath, and urine testing 
as Fourth Amendment searches because the tests infringe upon 
“expectation[s] of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.”119  Blood and breath tests physically intrude upon the 
body to obtain a sample of blood or “deep lung” breaths for analysis.120  
While urinalysis is not physically intrusive in the same way, the process 
by which the sample is obtained is irrefutably private.121  Likewise, the 
information revealed by urinalysis is personal, ranging from drug use 
to medical conditions, such as epilepsy and diabetes.122 
After establishing that such testing falls within the ambit of the 
Constitution, the Court paved the way to warrantlessly collecting 
specimens for testing.123  The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant 
to conduct a search, but that necessity is dispensed with when an 
exception applies.124  Luckily for employers, one such exception 
applies when “special needs [] beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement” motivate the search.125  In such a case, rather than 
requiring a warrant or even a showing of probable cause to assess the 
reasonableness of the search, a court merely balances the 
government’s interest in conducting the search on the one hand and 
 
 115  Id. at 611.  
 116  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated . . . .”).   
 117  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 613–14.  
 118  Id. at 615–16. 
 119  Id. at 617.  
 120  Id. (citation and internal quotations marks omitted).  
 121  Id. (“[T]here are few activities in our society more personal or private than the 
passing of urine.  Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all.” 
(quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (1987))).  
 122  Id.  
 123  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.  
 124  Id. at 619.  
 125  Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).  
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the intrusion of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights on the 
other.126 
The Skinner Court identified the government’s interest as 
ensuring the safety of railroad employees and the train-commuting 
public, deterring employee use of drugs and alcohol, and ascertaining 
and eliminating the causes of accidents.127  In fact, the “safety-sensitive 
tasks” that the covered employees performed, such as operating the 
trains and maintaining the signal systems, made the government 
interest in Skinner even stronger, since these were “duties fraught with 
such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention 
can have disastrous consequences.”128 
The Court then balanced the employees’ interest in privacy and 
bodily integrity against the government’s strong interest in safety and 
found that, while not insignificant, the employees’ privacy interests 
were minimally implicated by the testing program.129  To begin with, 
blood tests are routinely and safely performed during annual physicals, 
such that they do not hurt or traumatize employees.130  Breath tests are 
even less intrusive and can be done “with a minimum of inconvenience 
or embarrassment.”131  Likewise, while urinalysis implicates privacy 
concerns, the FRA regulations ensure a minimal intrusion by not 
requiring direct observation and by having non-railroad personnel 
obtain the samples in a medical environment.132  Under such 
circumstances, the urinalysis is similar to providing a urine sample 
during an annual physical.133  Furthermore, because the railroad 
industry is heavily regulated, employees have a “diminished 
expectation of privacy” as to “information relating to the[ir] physical 
condition,” such that their career choice decreases their privacy 
interest.134  The Court also noted that the regulations themselves 
provided those administering the tests with minimal discretion.135 
 
 
 126  Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979), and United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)).  
 127  Id. at 621, 632.  
 128  Id. at 620, 628.   
 129  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624–25.   
 130  Id. at 625 (explaining that blood tests generally extract minimal amounts of 
blood and “that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or 
pain” (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966))) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 131  Id. at 625.  
 132  Id. at 626–27.  
 133  Id. at 627.  
 134  Id. at 627–28.   
 135  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634.  
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Finally, the Court emphasized that the FRA created a program 
with “an effective means of deterring employees . . . from using 
controlled substances or alcohol in the first place.”136  Based on all of 
the circumstances, Skinner held that the test minimally intruded on 
privacy interests.137  As such, it was reasonable for the government to 
test safety-sensitive employees for impairment with neither a warrant 
nor probable cause because these employees can “cause great human 
loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors 
or others.”138 
2. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab 
In this Skinner companion case, the U.S. Customs Service, which 
processes people and items entering the country, implemented a 
testing policy for employees directly involved in drug interdiction, 
carrying firearms, or having access to “classified material.”139  The 
Service tested employees for “marijuana, cocaine, opiates, 
amphetamines, and phencyclidine,” and required them to provide a 
sample while a monitor listened “for the normal sounds of 
urination.”140  Following a confirmatory test, the Service sent the 
positive results to a licensed physician, who evaluated them along with 
the employee’s medical and prescription information to verify the 
presence of illegal substances.141  If the physician concluded that there 
was no legal explanation for the positive result, the employee would be 
dismissed.142 
To decide the case, the Supreme Court applied the 
reasonableness test just announced in Skinner.143  The government 
interests identified in Von Raab included deterring employees from 
using drugs and alcohol and “prevent[ing] the promotion of drug 
users to [the specified] positions.”144  The Court found that, as “our 
Nation’s first line of defense” against drug importation and its 
 
 136  Id. at 629–30 (noting that the program informed employees that they were 
subject to testing without disclosing the specific date, “significantly increas[ing] the 
deterrent effect” of the policy and adding to its legitimacy).  
 137  Id. at 628.  
 138  Id.  
 139  Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660–61 (1989).  
 140  Id. at 661–62.  
 141  Id. at 662.  
 142  Id. at 663.  
 143  Id. at 665–66 (summarizing the rule as holding that when a Fourth Amendment 
search is conducted to advance a “special governmental need,” the reasonableness of 
the search is determined by balancing the interests of the individual and of the 
government).   
 144  Id. at 666.   
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accompanying crime, Customs officials hold “safety-sensitive” 
occupations—if the agents are not alert as a result of their drug use, 
“[t]his national interest in self-protection could be irreparably 
damaged.”145  Moreover, it is uncontroverted that handling weapons is 
a safety-sensitive task fraught with risks of catastrophic injury.146  The 
Court concluded that the public “should not bear the risk” of such 
employees working while impaired and that the burden should instead 
fall on the U.S. Customs Service and its employees.147 
While Customs agents undoubtedly have an interest in their 
bodily integrity and informational privacy, the majority held that the 
agents’ interests are “diminished” with respect to “the intrusions 
occasioned by a urine test.”148  As in Skinner, the Court emphasized the 
effect of the nature of the employees’ occupation on their reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and noted that employees working with drugs 
and/or guns must expect inquiries as to “their fitness and probity.”149  
Further, the procedures outlined in the policy minimized the 
invasiveness of the program by avoiding direct observation, testing 
solely for the presence of drugs, and not requiring the employee to 
disclose his medical information unless he tested positive for drugs.150 
Von Raab shed light on three additional considerations in 
assessing the reasonableness of workplace testing.  First, the Court 
opined that requiring individualized suspicion in such a non-
traditional work environment would be impracticable since Customs 
agents are not amenable to “the kind of day-to-day scrutiny that is the 
norm” in an office environment.151  Secondly, the lack of a known drug 
problem pervading the Customs Service was not dispositive of the 
program’s legality because “no segment of society is immune from the 
threat of illegal drug use,” and in any event, the agency is entitled to 
enact a program that seeks to both detect drug use and “prevent the 
promotion of drug users.”152  Finally, the access that agents have to the 
“vast sources of [confiscated] valuable contraband” provides another 
reason to test, due to the inevitable temptation presented to drug-
using employees.153 
 
 145  Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668, 670.   
 146  Id. at 670.  
 147  Id. at 670–71.  
 148  Id. at 672.   
 149  Id.   
 150  Id. at 672 n.2.  
 151  Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674.  
 152  Id. at 660 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), 674–75.   
 153  Id. at 669.  
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3. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton 
The third drug testing case to reach the Supreme Court featured 
a new kind of authority imposing the drug test: rather than an 
employer testing its employees, in Acton, a school district, comprised 
of a high school and three grade schools in Vernonia, Oregon, was 
testing its students.154  After noticing an increase in drug use in the 
1980s, the Vernonia School District implemented a testing program to 
eradicate school drug use by testing “the leaders of the drug culture,” 
the school athletes.155  In Vernonia, to join a school sports team, a 
student had to submit a consent form, signed by himself and his 
parents, agreeing to be drug tested at the beginning of the season and 
then randomly throughout.156  The students provided the urine sample 
in an “empty locker room accompanied by an adult monitor of the 
same sex.”157  The samples were tested for amphetamines, cocaine, and 
marijuana, but administrators could request testing for other drugs.158  
An outside laboratory tested the samples and sent the reports to the 
school superintendent, but the vice-principals and athletic directors 
also had access to the results.159  A positive drug test resulted in either 
a six-week assistance program with weekly urinalysis or suspension 
from the team for the rest of the current season and the following 
season.160 
The plaintiff, a seventh-grade boy not admitted to the football 
team for failure to sign the consent form, filed suit against the school 
for violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.161  In 
assessing the reasonableness of the program, the Court first noted the 
key player in Acton: the administration of a public school district, an 
entity with “a degree of supervision and control” over the minors 
within its care.162  Because of the school’s caretaking role and the 
students’ status as minors, Acton and his classmates necessarily enjoyed 
a lesser expectation of privacy.163  Additionally, the student-athlete 
subset reasonably held an even lower expectation of privacy because of 
the regulations accompanying participation in school sports (such as 
 
 154  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995).   
 155  Id. at 648–50.   
 156  Id. at 650.  
 157  Id.   
 158  Id. at 650–51.   
 159  Id. at 651.  
 160  Acton, 515 U.S. at 651.   
 161  Id.   
 162  Id. at 655.  
 163  Id. at 654.   
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preseason physicals and minimum grade point averages), as well as the 
public exposure inherent in being a part of a team (changing in the 
locker rooms, communal showering, etc.).164 
Further, the Court found the invasiveness of the sample-collecting 
method “negligible.”165  Because the students provided the specimens 
either from a urinal or bathroom stall, the “conditions [we]re nearly 
identical to those typically encountered in public restrooms.”166  
Although the majority expressed concern that the school required the 
disclosure of medication information prior to testing, the Justices 
noted that such disclosures did not present a significant infringement: 
while precedent holds that it is favorable to not disclose prescription 
data until after a positive test result, the Court never held that 
“requiring advance disclosure of medications is per se unreasonable.”167 
Ultimately, the Court found that the government’s interest in 
deterring drug use among students is as weighty as deterring the same 
among Customs officials involved in drug interdiction and engineers 
operating locomotives.168  The majority reasoned that middle- and 
high-school aged children are already especially susceptible to the 
psychological and physiological effects of drugs, and the added 
concern of impaired students physically injuring one another while 
partaking in a school sporting event further solidified the school 
district’s grave interest.169  Moreover, the Court found the program to 
be effective because it merely tested the school’s student athletes, who 
heavily influenced drug and alcohol use among the general student 
body.170  Based on the students’ low expectation of privacy, the 
program’s narrow tailoring and minimal level of intrusion, and the 
strong government interest at hand, the Vernonia School District’s 
drug screening policy was upheld as reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.171 
 
 
 164  Id. at 657. 
 165  Id. at 658.  
 166  Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.  
 167  Id. at 659.   
 168  Id. at 661.   
 169  Id. at 661–62.   
 170  Id. at 663 (opining that the school district may have been even more justified in 
implementing this program than the government in Skinner because of how tailored 
the school district’s solution was as compared to Skinner, which applied to all railroads 
across the country).  
 171  Id. at 664–65.   
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4. Chandler v. Miller 
In 1997, the Supreme Court rounded out its approach to 
employee drug testing when it handed down Chandler v. Miller.172  In 
Chandler, the Georgia Legislature enacted a statute that required 
candidates running for state office to test negatively for drugs “within 
thirty days prior to qualifying for nomination or election.”173  The 
plaintiffs, Libertarian Party nominees, filed suit to enjoin the program 
for violating their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.174  
Following the decisions in Skinner, Von Raab, and Acton, the Eleventh 
Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of the injunction, finding that 
political officials were “vested with the highest executive authority to 
make public policy,” and as such, required “the highest levels of 
honesty, clear-sightedness, and clear-thinking.”175 
For the first time in the Court’s drug testing case history, it held 
that the statute violated the candidates’ Fourth Amendment rights.176  
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the test was minimally invasive: 
the government tested only for the presence of drugs; the candidates 
controlled the release of their results; and testing took place in a 
doctor’s office of each candidate’s choosing.177  Nevertheless, Georgia 
had not set forth a “sufficiently vital” special need to test—although 
abusing drugs and/or alcohol is incompatible with the proper 
discharge of public functions, the Court held that incompatibility 
alone is not a special governmental need.178 
The majority also noted that the conditions that weighed toward 
a finding of reasonableness in prior cases were not present in Chandler, 
such as “a demonstrated problem of drug abuse,”179 the inability to 
monitor the employees daily to garner an individualized suspicion,180 
and the existence of “high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks.”181  As such, the 
Court concluded that Georgia’s need was not special, but rather 
 
 172  Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997). 
 173  Id. at 309–10 (some of the offices for which Georgia required testing include: 
governor or lieutenant governor; state Attorney General; state court judge; district 
attorney; or Public Service Commission member).   
 174  Id. at 310.  
 175  Id. at 311.  
 176  Id. at 323.  
 177  Id. at 312, 318.  
 178  Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318, 321–22.  
 179  Id. at 319.  
 180  Id. at 321.   
 181  Id. at 321–22.  The Court distinguished this case from Skinner and Von Raab by 
emphasizing that politicians do not genuinely endanger public safety through their 
actions.  Id. at 323.   
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“symbolic,” and opined that infringing personal privacy for the sake of 
a symbol is precisely what the Fourth Amendment was intended to 
prevent.182 
B. Framework 
The guidance provided by Skinner, Von Raab, Acton, and Chandler 
demonstrates that when a search is conducted for reasons besides 
ordinary law enforcement needs, it constitutes a “special need.”183  Such 
a need dispenses with the traditional requirements of a warrant and 
probable cause to search an individual.184  Accordingly, to determine 
the reasonableness of the search, the court must balance the 
government’s interest in testing against the employee’s privacy 
interests.185  Some of the factors that the Court has considered in this 
determination include: whether the employee performs safety-
sensitive duties;186 whether the employee works in a highly regulated 
field;187 whether the industry currently faces a drug and/or alcohol use 
problem;188 how much the test intrudes upon privacy interests;189 and 
whether the government interest is in the health and safety of 
employees and/or third parties, or a symbolic interest in a drug free 
appearance.190 
V. DRUG TESTING HCWS WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of citizens “to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”191  The Supreme Court has held 
that the Fourth Amendment “guarantees the privacy, dignity, and 
security of persons against . . . invasive acts by officers of the 
Government or those acting at their direction.”192  In Acton, the 
 
 182  Id. at 322.  
 183  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).  
 184  Id. 
 185  Id. 
 186  Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321–22; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620; Nat’l Treasury Emps. 
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 669–70 (1989).  
 187  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 
627; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671–72.   
 188  Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321; Acton, 515 U.S. at 648–49; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606–07.   
 189  Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318; Acton, 515 U.S. at 658; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624–25; Von 
Raab, 489 U.S. at 672.  
 190  Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321–22; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 630.   
 191  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.   
 192  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 613–14.   
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Supreme Court clarified that state-administered or -mandated testing 
triggers the protections of the Fourth Amendment because the Bill of 
Rights is incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply 
to state and local governments.193  Accordingly, should a state adopt a 
statute mandating the drug testing of HCWs, as Proposition 46 and the 
original HB-597 proposed to do, the statute would be subject to the 
Fourth Amendment because employers would be acting at the 
direction of the state government.194  Further, the tests qualify as 
searches because the Skinner Court held that subjecting individuals to 
breathalyzer tests and urinalysis is an intrusion on a reasonable 
expectation of privacy that implicates the Fourth Amendment.195 
As seen in the Skinner-Von Raab line of cases, workplace drug and 
alcohol testing is motivated by a “special need,” such that neither a 
warrant nor probable cause is required to lawfully test.196  Because a 
model testing statute would not aim primarily to release test results to 
law enforcement, but instead to ascertain and deter impairment 
among physicians, such a statute would be motivated by a “special 
need.”197  Thus, the reasonableness of the statute would be determined 
by balancing the competing interests of the government and the 
individual. 
A. The State Interest Inquiry 
Assessing the government’s interest in drug testing entails 
considering both the nature and immediacy of the state’s need to test 
and the efficacy of the means by which the government achieves that 
goal.198 
1. The Nature and Immediacy of the State’s Need to Test 
The nature of the government concern at issue is the undeniably 
important interest in protecting the public, and the concern is 
immediate because of the safety-sensitive tasks performed by HCWs, as 
 
 193  Acton, 515 U.S. at 652 (“We have held that the Fourteenth Amendment extends 
this constitutional guarantee to searches and seizures by state officers . . . .”). 
 194  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614.  
 195  Id. at 616–17.   
 196  Id. at 620.  
 197  Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.10 (referring to 49 C.F.R. § 40 as 
governing the privacy and confidentiality of the proposed testing).  49 C.F.R. § 40.321 
prohibits employers from releasing an employee’s test results without his written 
consent—adopting this aspect of the DOT regulations demonstrates that California’s 
primary motivation in implementing the PPSA is a special need, not regular criminal 
evidence gathering.  49 C.F.R. § 40.321 (2016).  
 198  See Acton, 515 U.S. at 660.  
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well as the hard-to-monitor drug-filled environment in which they 
work.  To begin with, there is one common thread uniting HCWs, U.S. 
Customs officers, and railroad employees that weighs heavily in favor 
of the permissibility of testing HCWs: the safety-sensitive nature of the 
professionals’ duties.  The Skinner Court acknowledged the danger 
accompanying drug and/or alcohol use by the general population, but 
went on to state, “it is a separate and far more dangerous wrong to 
perform certain sensitive tasks while under the influence of those 
substances.”199  An inebriated train operator can derail a train and 
cause multiple fatalities.  An impaired and armed U.S. Customs official 
in an airport can fire at a civilian, or an addicted officer can fall prey 
to bribery by a drug smuggler and endanger our safety by introducing 
more contraband into our country.  The threat posed by a drugged 
HCW, while dangerous on a smaller scale, is more immediate and 
arguably more likely than the threats posed by the aforementioned 
professionals, since the health and safety of the patient is more 
proximately linked to the actions of the HCW—and some courts have 
held just that. 
In Kemp v. Claiborne County Hospital, the Southern District of 
Mississippi found the drug testing of a scrub nurse reasonable because 
of the direct risks she posed to her patients.200  The Kemp court focused 
on the safety-sensitive nature of the nurse’s job and found “the 
‘immediacy’ of the threat posed to the public” by the impaired 
employee to be “[t]he most salient factor.”201  Thus, although it would 
be rare for a drunk HCW to endanger the lives of multiple people,202 it 
is undeniable that a HCW poses a more immediate and more likely 
threat to his patient when operating under the influence than the 
threat posed by a train conductor. 
In a case out of the Northern District of California, American 
Federation of Government Employees L-2110 v. Derwinski, the district court 
upheld the random testing policy implemented by the Veteran’s 
Association Hospital due to “the possibility of catastrophic accident” 
that accompanies direct patient contact.203  The plaintiff HCWs who 
sued to enjoin the testing program included a Clinical Specialist 
 
 199  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633.  
 200  Kemp v. Claiborne Cty. Hosp., 763 F. Supp. 1362, 1367, 1369 (S.D. Miss. 1991).  
 201  Id. at 1367 (citing Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Sullivan, 744 F. Supp. 294, 300 
(D.D.C. 1990)). 
 202  Although it is rare that a doctor might harm more than one person at once, it 
is certainly possible—should an impaired doctor fail to vaccinate a child or expose a 
patient to a contagious disease, he may very well cause an epidemic.  
 203  Am. Fed’n of Gov’t. Emps. L-2110 v. Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. 1493, 1498 (N.D. 
Cal. 1991).   
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Pharmacist, a licensed graduate nurse, a Medical Technologist, a 
physician-pathologist, and a Dialysis Unit supervisor.204  It is key that, 
like the plaintiff in Kemp, some of these employees had very little 
opportunity to erroneously operate on a patient or prescribe a fatal 
dosage of a drug.205  Nonetheless, the Derwinski court found that all of 
the plaintiffs had “active patient care responsibilities, either directly or 
in the providing of necessary diagnostic or therapeutic care to 
patients,” and such care, even if it amounted to only five percent of an 
employee’s time, justified testing for impairment.206 
Thus, the safety-sensitive nature of HCWs’ duties plainly points to 
a serious government interest in testing: while the threatened danger 
to a patient depends on the type of medicine involved and the level of 
direct patient contact, HCWs can endanger a life by providing any kind 
of care to patients.  Moreover, while U.S. Customs officials and railroad 
employees may often work in small groups, a doctor usually tends to a 
patient on a one-on-one basis, save for a nurse, decreasing the chance 
of a third party stepping in to prevent or correct his erratic behavior 
or poor judgment.  Consequently, based on case law pertaining to drug 
testing HCWs, as well as a comparison of the threats HCWs and the 
tested employees in the Skinner-Von Raab line of cases pose, it is 
irrefutable that medical professionals occupy a safety-sensitive 
occupation. 
A second factor that weighs in favor of the government interest in 
drug testing HCWs is the importance of the interest itself—ensuring 
patient safety by deterring the use of drugs and/or alcohol at work, 
and ascertaining and eliminating the causes of medical error.207  
Because an HCW’s professional objective is to affect the condition of a 
patient’s body, it is not difficult to imagine how an inebriated HCW 
could harm a patient due to a lapse in judgment.  For example, a 
 
 204  Id. at 1495–97.  
 205  Id. at 1496–97 (noting that a nurse, Medical Technologist, and Dialysis Unit 
supervisor infrequently have contact with patients).  
 206  Id. at 1496, 1498 (holding that a nurse was lawfully subject to testing even 
though she had no access to narcotic drugs, did not handle surgical instruments, and 
“devote[d] only five percent or less of her time to patient care,” because that fraction 
of time was “significant . . . considering the importance of the care then rendered”).  
Hence, the court seemed to adopt the majority’s position in Skinner that certain duties 
are so dangerous “that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous 
consequences.”  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989).   
 207  Prop. 46: Drug and Alcohol Testing of Doctors; Medical Negligence Lawsuits; Initiative 
Statute, SEC’Y OF STATE OF CAL., http://vigarchive.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/en/ 
propositions/46/arguments-rebuttals.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).  These 
motivations, then, are very similar to the government interests advanced in Skinner.  See 
discussion supra Part IV.A.1.  
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drunken doctor could leave in the middle of an open-heart surgery to 
go out to lunch, or could badly err in delivering a baby, rendering the 
birthing mother a quadriplegic.208  The data and reports of impaired 
HCWs209 demonstrate that the interest in testing is not merely 
“symbolic,” like Georgia’s interest in Chandler, but rather is a concrete 
problem that needs a solution.210 
The Acton Court upheld the testing of student athletes because 
athletes who are impaired while playing a sport may harm a teammate 
or opponent—certainly the concern that a HCW, wielding surgical 
tools or a prescription pad, will harm a patient under his care is just as 
strong as the fear that a high soccer player will run into a teammate on 
the field.211  Further, the Derwinski court recognized the interest in 
testing hospital employees as ensuring the integrity of the workers and 
enhancing public safety.212  The district court held that maintaining the 
integrity of the medical profession is “of compelling concern” because 
hospitals “exist for precisely [the] purpose” of ensuring the safety of 
those who seek medical attention.213  The Supreme Court reached a 
similar conclusion in Von Raab in finding the testing of U.S. Customs 
officials necessary to ensure the officers’ commitment to the mission 
at hand.214  Thus, while this interest may seem to mirror Chandler’s 
symbolic interest, the gravity of the duties performed distinguishes the 
interest in upholding a doctor’s ethical obligation to remain sober 
 
 208  Press Release, Consumer Watchdog, Consumer Watchdog Campaign: 
California Ballot Initiative Will Enact Nation’s First Law Requiring Random Drug 
Testing of Physicians (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/ 
newsrelease/consumer-watchdog-campaign-california-ballot-initiative-will-enact-
nation’s-first-law-re.  The patient who was left on the operating table while his drunken 
doctor stepped out for lunch is in a permanent vegetative state as a result of his 
physician’s negligence.  Id.  The patient whose intoxicated doctor used forceps in her 
delivery is paralyzed from the neck down because her doctor “stretch[ed] her neck 
and spinal cord like taffy.”  Id.; see also Edward J. Boyer, Girl Wins $21 Million in 
Malpractice Suit, L.A. TIMES (July 2, 1991), http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-
02/local/me-1814_1_spinal-cord-injury (explaining the patient’s allegation that, after 
her delivery, two other doctors “entered a conspiracy of silence” to protect the 
delivering doctor despite the clear evidence of his negligence and instead told her 
family that she “had a hereditary disease and would die in a few months”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 209  See discussion supra Part III. 
 210  Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997) (stating that while there need not 
be a documented problem of substance abuse among the employees at issue, such a 
finding helps “shore up” the need for government involvement).  
 211  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662 (1995).   
 212  Am. Fed’n of Gov’t. Emps. L-2110 v. Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. 1493, 1498 (N.D. 
Cal. 1991).  
 213  Id.  
 214  Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670 (1989).   
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while treating a patient from a mere desire to show a commitment to 
a drug-free workplace. 
Finally, the government interest in testing HCWs is particularly 
strong because of the nature of the HCWs’ work environment.  The 
Von Raab Court noted that Customs officials are on the front lines of 
drug interdiction, so an impaired or addicted employee may be 
seduced by the sizeable stash of drugs under his control.215  This 
concern also applies to HCWs, who have access to an abundance of 
addictive drugs.  The proximity to drugs is certainly a temptation to 
overwhelmed HCWs, and only seems to enable addictions and provide 
breeding grounds for medical negligence.216  In fact, the Derwinski 
court took note of the fact that, like U.S. Customs agents, medical 
employees work in a unique environment with its own temptations, 
and held that “[t]he propinquity to drugs is therefore a factor to be 
weighed in the balance.”217  Consequently, based on the demonstrated 
problem of drug- and alcohol-impaired HCWs causing harm to 
patients, the special responsibilities these professionals carry out, and 
the unique environment in which they work, states have a significant 
interest in testing HCWs. 
2. The Efficacy of the Testing Program and the Character 
of the Intrusion 
Two other factors that a state must prove before it can drug test 
HCWs are how effective a testing program will be in uncovering and 
deterring drug and alcohol use among medical employees, and how 
minimally the program will infringe upon the privacy of medical 
professionals. 
Based on the evidence noting the high rate of drug and alcohol 
abuse among HCWs and the “culture of silence” permeating the 
medical field,218 to effectively address a state’s interest in protecting 
patients, a drug testing program is clearly necessary.  First, there is a 
documented problem of substance abuse among HCWs nationwide.219  
 
 215  Id. at 668–69.   
 216  Berge et al., supra note 39, at 625 (describing a five-year study of doctors in 
physician health programs, which revealed that one of the contributing factors to 
physician drug use is the “ready access to narcotics and other psychotropic drugs in 
the workplace”).   
 217  Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. at 1499. 
 218  See discussion supra Part III.   
 219  Eisler, supra note 40 (citing a 2007 report by U.S. Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health Services Administration, which stated that “an average of 103,000 doctors, 
nurses, medical technicians and health care aides a year were abusing or dependent 
on illicit drugs”).   
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In upholding the railroad’s testing program, the Skinner Court noted 
the problem of drug and alcohol use by railroad employees.220  
Likewise, the Acton Court opined that the school’s program was 
appropriately tailored to address its drug problem because the 
individuals to be tested were the “leaders of the drug culture.”221  Thus, 
although proof of a demonstrated substance abuse problem is not a 
necessary predicate for testing,222 the presence of such a problem 
among HCWs reveals the need for some sort of government 
involvement to protect third parties. 
Both the PPSA and the original HB-597 pushed for random drug 
testing to deter drug and alcohol use among HCWs, and to ascertain 
the source of medical error due to such impairment.223  But the two 
acts differed in their breadth.  For example, the PPSA aimed to 
randomly drug test all “physicians” with admitting privileges at a 
hospital, whether that physician was an employee or independent 
contractor and regardless of his specific area of medicine.224  On the 
other hand, the original New Hampshire bill was even broader than 
the PPSA because it aimed to tie the state licensure of health care 
facilities to their creation of a mandatory random drug testing 
program: if the facility did not test each worker at least four times per 
year, its license would be suspended.225  Because HB-597 was enacted 
in response to the drug diversion of a medical technician as opposed 
to a physician, the act would have tested all workers and not just certain 
physicians.226  Hence, although the empirical data cited above227 seems 
to apply more to doctors, the model testing policy cannot be so limited 
because the Mr. Kwiatkowskis of the world can harm patients just as 
much as the Dr. Duntschs. 
Secondly, in upholding the U.S. Customs Service’s policy, the Von 
Raab Court emphasized that Customs officials were our nation’s “first 
line of defense” against the introduction of contraband into the 
country.228  To some degree, then, the Court found it important that 
the public relied on Customs officials to protect the country’s borders, 
which made it reasonable to ensure (by testing) that the employees 
 
 220  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 607–08 (1989).   
 221  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649 (1995).  
 222  Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997).   
 223  Proposition 46, supra note 10; HB-597, supra note 5. 
 224  Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 §§ 2350.15(e), 2350.25(a)(1).  
 225  Abramson et al., supra note 6, at 13.   
 226  Id.   
 227  See discussion supra Part III. 
 228  Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989).  
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possessed their full faculties while carrying out their duties.229  In the 
same sense, HCWs owe their patients those same fiduciary duties—
members of the public rely on medical professionals to take care of 
their mental and physical well being, such that it is reasonable to 
randomly test HCWs to ensure their sobriety. 
Further, the seriousness of the work HCWs perform warrants 
departure from the requirement of individualized suspicion to test 
them.  The Skinner Court held that, as to railroad employees, requiring 
an employer to prove an individualized suspicion following an adverse 
event would impede his ability to ascertain the cause of the accident 
and quickly remove the impaired employees responsible.230  Moreover, 
the Court held that it would be reasonable to randomly test because it 
provides a more effective deterrent among the employees.231  For the 
same reasons, randomly testing HCWs is an effective way to deter drug 
and alcohol use, and to protect patients by discovering and removing 
impaired medical employees. 
Allowing suspicionless drug testing in the medical profession is 
not only wise in theory, it is also warranted based on the culture of the 
field today.  Many advocates in the medical field have spoken out about 
the need for suspicionless testing based on their personal experiences 
with substance abuse or with addicted colleagues.232  For example, Dr. 
Stephen Loyd, a doctor of internal medicine practicing in Tennessee, 
has revealed that although he was heavily addicted to narcotics while 
practicing—taking up to 100 pills a day—none of his colleagues ever 
reported him or intervened despite his erratic behavior and decreased 
work quality.233  Similarly, an article published by the Mayo Foundation 
acknowledges the difficulty in getting help for doctors, even though 
their rate of substance abuse is equal to, if not greater than, the rate of 
abuse among the general population, because “a physician’s family 
members and coworkers will often participate in a ‘conspiracy of 
 
 229  Id. at 670.  
 230  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 630–31 (1989).  
 231  Id. at 630.   
 232  See Consumer Watchdog, supra note 37; see also Levinson & Broadhust, supra 
note 87; Julius Cuong Pham et al., Identification of Physician Impairment, JAMA, May 
2013, at 2101, 2101 (suggesting the use of random testing in a model regulation for 
physician impairment); Julius Cuong Pham & Peter J. Provonost, California’s Proposition 
46: A Wolf in Sheep’s Wool, ANNALS INTERNAL MED., Sept. 30, 2014, at 913, 913 
(explaining that a key principle of a program for physician drug testing includes 
random testing); Ken Murray, Opinion, How to Deal with Doctors Who Get Drunk and High 
on the Job, TIME (June 19, 2014), http://time.com/2901422/doctors-drunk-high/ 
(calling for mandatory testing because “patient safety concerns justify such testing for 
physicians”).   
 233  Eisler, supra note 40. 
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silence’ in an effort to protect the family or practice workers from 
economic ruin by the loss of the physician’s job and income.”234  It is 
quite plain, then, that the unwillingness to report a HCW is not limited 
to Dr. Loyd and his colleagues, but medical employees across the 
country.235 
Moreover, a doctor’s office or hospital surely fits within the non-
traditional office environment discussed in Von Raab.236  For instance, 
doctors mostly work alone or with only one other medical professional 
when treating a patient.237  Further, HCWs as a class frequently work 
for lengthy periods of time, so their colleagues might misinterpret 
signs of impairment as signs of fatigue.  The ambiguity of the indicators 
of substance use, the infrequent contact with other colleagues, and the 
culture of silence within the medical profession all point to the 
impracticability of relying on this atypical work environment to garner 
an individualized suspicion of impairment on the job.  As such, a 
testing policy that aims to eradicate and deter drug use among HCWs 
must feature random testing. 
Finally, the state must prove the efficacy of the chosen testing 
procedure and demonstrate that its invasiveness is justified given the 
state’s interest in testing.  The Skinner Court noted that while blood, 
breath, and urine tests are all physical intrusions of the body, they are 
negligible because they: mirror the testing done during a visit to the 
doctor’s office; reveal nothing more than the presence of drugs and/
or alcohol; and can be done with minimal embarrassment or 
inconvenience.238  Further, the American Society of Addiction 
Medicine reports that urine testing is the most common form of drug 
testing because it is the most familiar, the least expensive to analyze, 
and can include a range of drugs on a test panel, while breath testing 
is the standard means for testing a person for alcohol impairment.239 
Moreover, the program set forth in the PPSA followed the FAA 
drug testing guidelines, which courts have upheld as posing a minimal 
 
 234  Berge et al., supra note 39, at 625.   
 235  See discussion supra Part III. 
 236   Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989).   
 237  Elbein, supra note 84 (explaining that, even though Baylor Regional Medical 
Center of Plano suspended Dr. Duntsch after another surgeon witnessed his mishaps 
in the operating room, requiring him to be monitored when performing surgeries, Dr. 
Duntsch operated on Kellie Martin alone because the operation “was supposed to be 
a simple procedure” that a doctor would ordinarily perform alone).  
 238  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 625–27 (1989).   
 239  See WRITING COMM., AM. SOC’Y ADDICTION MED., DRUG TESTING: A WHITE PAPER 
OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF ADDICTION MEDICINE (ASAM) 23, 26 (2013), 
http://www.asam.org/docs/default-source/publicy-policy-statements/drug-testing-a-
white-paper-by-asam.pdf.  
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threat of intrusiveness.240  The guidelines do not require direct 
observation of the employee providing the sample—typically, the 
testing atmosphere mirrors the public bathroom experience or an 
annual physical examination.241  Such an environment presents a 
“negligible” invasion of privacy according to the Acton Court.242  
Further, the FAA program does not test the urine sample for anything 
but the presence of specifically enumerated drugs: opiates, marijuana, 
cocaine, amphetamines, and phencyclidine.243  In the event that a urine 
or breath sample indicates the presence of drugs and/or alcohol, a 
second test is done to confirm the positive finding.244  Even upon 
confirmation, the results are not reported to the employer until a 
licensed physician has analyzed them in conjunction with medical 
information provided by the employee to find a legal explanation for 
any positive match.245  Finally, the results of the test are sent to the 
employer alone and may not be disseminated without the employee’s 
consent.246 
B. The Individual Interest in Privacy 
The final step in assessing the reasonableness of a testing program 
is weighing the individual’s privacy interest that is threatened.  As 
mentioned in the Skinner-Von Raab line of cases, urinalysis and 
breathalyzer tests constitute Fourth Amendment searches that invade 
one’s bodily and informational privacy.247  As the Fifth Circuit noted in 
Von Raab, urinating is an activity that society recognizes as private,248 
and while obtaining breath samples does not require an invasion of 
privacy in the same way, it could embarrass the employee and be 
inconvenient.249  Further, employees have an interest in shielding their 
 
 240  Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers Ass’n v. Burnley, 700 F. Supp. 1043, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 
1988).   
 241  49 C.F.R. § 40.41(e), (f) (2016).   
 242  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995).  
 243  49 C.F.R. § 40.85.   
 244  14 C.F.R. § 120.5 (2016) (explaining that testing programs must conform to 
procedures set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 40); see also 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.251 (for alcohol), 40.87 
(for drugs).  
 245  49 C.F.R. §§ 40.97, 40.123. 
 246  49 C.F.R. § 40.321.  This aspect also justifies the use of the special needs doctrine 
in drug testing: had the results been sent to law enforcement upon a finding of drug 
use, the program would not be motivated by a purpose other than ordinary law 
enforcement, and the search would be unconstitutional.   
 247  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989).   
 248  Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(“There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of 
urine.”).   
 249  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625.  
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biological, physiological, and medical information from others—a 
urine test could reveal information beyond just the presence of drugs, 
such as whether the employee is diabetic or pregnant.250 
Accordingly, while the privacy interest threatened in providing 
breath and/or urine samples is not insignificant, the individuals 
subject to testing, HCWs, have a diminished expectation of privacy 
because their profession is heavily regulated and/or is inherently 
dangerous.251  Like the railroad industry, the medical profession is 
heavily regulated, although mostly at the state level.252  Doctors, for 
example, cannot practice until they have completed years of schooling 
and training and have acquired a state license to practice.253  Once a 
physician obtains his license, he is subject to regulation by the state 
medical board, which supervises licensing and disciplinary 
procedures.254  For example, the California Board’s website provides 
visitors with a 104-page document that describes the laws governing the 
practice of medicine within the state, from general licensing to 
ordering controlled substances.255  It appears, then, that the medical 
field is as highly regulated as the railroad industry, leaving physicians 
with a decreased expectation of privacy. 
Further, in upholding the Veteran’s Association Hospital’s testing 
program, the Derwinski court took a page out of Von Raab and 
remarked that “[t]hose held out as medical professionals” have an 
“aura of professional competence,” such that it is unlikely for such 
employees to “reasonably hold the same expectation of privacy as that 
entertained by a clerical worker or other nonprofessional employee in 
federal service.”256  Because providing medical care is as regulated as 
 
 250  Id. at 617.  
 251  Id. at 627 (explaining that railroad employees hold a low reasonable 
expectation of privacy because they are subject to a litany of governmental rules at the 
federal level); see also Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672 
(1989) (opining that those working with guns and drugs should expect to be subject 
to testing because of the danger inherent in their work). 
 252  Deborah Haas-Wilson, The Regulation of Health Care Professionals Other than 
Physicians, CATO INST., http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/ 
regulation/1992/10/reg15n4d.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).  
 253  Requirements for Becoming a Physician, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/education-careers/becoming-physician.page? (last visited Feb. 14, 
2016).  
 254  MED. BD. OF CAL., GUIDE TO THE LAWS GOVERNING THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE BY 
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS 7 (7th ed. 2013), http://www.mbc.ca.gov/About_Us/ 
Laws/laws_guide.pdf.  
 255  See id.  
 256   Am. Fed’n of Gov’t. Emps. L-2110 v. Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. 1493, 1499 (N.D. 
Cal. 1991).  The court also remarked that the grave “life and death” atmosphere in 
which a physician carries out his duties necessarily means he holds “a lesser 
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operating a train and as dangerous as handling a firearm to protect 
our borders, albeit dangerous on a smaller scale in terms of potential 
casualties, individuals who voluntarily choose to occupy these positions 
must accept their diminished expectation of privacy.257 
This analysis balancing the employee-HCW’s privacy interest 
against the state’s interest in testing him for impairment demonstrates 
that it would not violate the Fourth Amendment for a state to adopt a 
statute mandating testing for HCWs.  Specifically, the nature and 
immediacy of the government’s interest, the efficacy of testing, and the 
character of the intrusion all buttress the state’s interest in testing 
HCWs for drugs and/or alcohol to protect the public. 
VI. MODEL STATUTE: THE GUIDEPOSTS TO INCLUDE WITHIN A STATUTE 
MANDATING HCW DRUG TESTING 
Taking into consideration drug testing precedent, as well as 
California and New Hampshire’s attempts to mandate such testing, 
this Comment proposes some guideposts that a model statute should 
include to ensure a constitutional, effective, and fair testing program.258  
Such a statute would: specifically enumerate the chosen procedure; 
include pre-employment, random, suspicion-based, adverse event, 
return-to-duty, and follow-up testing; test all HCWs; provide swift 
consequences that are tailored to the infraction; and provide for a 
comprehensive approach to a drug-free work environment by 
supporting state physician health programs, requiring medical schools 
to test students and educate them on the danger of impairment, and 
enacting a whistleblower law to encourage medical professionals to 
refer colleagues for help. 
 
 
 
expectation of privacy in [his] ability to provide the services necessary to perform [his] 
duties.”  Id. (citation omitted).  
 257  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) (“Somewhat like 
adults who choose to participate in a closely regulated industry, students who 
voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon 
normal rights and privileges, including privacy.”) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 258  See also Pham & Provonost, supra note 232 (setting forth “the key principles of a 
program for physician drug testing,” which include: 1) a focus on identification and 
rehabilitation rather than punishment; 2) confidentiality; 3) mandatory pre-
employment, pre-appointment, or pre-licensure testing; 4) random testing; 5) for-
cause testing, such as adverse event testing; and 6) initially limiting testing programs 
to hospitals, “where the bylaws and infrastructure can support the program”).  
HALAT (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2016  12:55 PM 
974 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:939 
A. The Statute Must Delineate the Specifics 
In its attempt to mandate physician drug testing, the PPSA 
provided hospitals with a ready-made policy to implement.259  The 
advantage of taking the initiative in this manner is the confidence that 
comes with creating a constitutional testing program.260  The FAA 
regulations pose a minimal threat of invading an employee’s privacy: 
not only do they ensure bodily (by not requiring direct observation) 
and informational (by limiting the use of the test results) privacy, but 
they also provide the test administrators with little, if any, discretion in 
carrying out their duties.261  In adopting the FAA guidelines, the PPSA 
likewise promised physicians minimal invasiveness in implementing 
the program. 
On the other hand, HB-597 did not specifically provide a testing 
program for employer-health care facilities, but merely mandated that 
the state Commissioner of Health and Human Services establish and 
implement “a mandatory random drug testing program,” leaving the 
specifics up to the Commissioner himself.262 
While it might be helpful to have a universal method of testing 
among the state’s health care facilities, there are benefits to allowing 
each facility to adopt its own procedure: the facilities can do their own 
cost-benefit analyses and find economically feasible, yet effective, 
plans.  It is key to note, though, that if a statute mandates that facilities 
adopt their own policies as opposed to providing a universal program, 
it is important to define the terms that apply to all facilities (i.e., tests 
must be random and must be done “X” number of times per year, etc.). 
B. Forms of Suggested Testing 
1. HCWs Should Be Tested Pre-Employment, Randomly, 
After an Adverse Event, Upon a Reasonable Suspicion, 
and After Returning to Duty from Treatment 
Based on the incidence of drug and alcohol use among medical 
professionals and the failure of the system’s current policy of self-
regulation, drug testing is necessary to ascertain and deter drug use in 
the field.  Of the two proposed pieces of legislation discussed in this 
Comment, only Proposition 46 set forth a testing procedure to apply 
 
 259  Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4.  
 260  Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451, 457 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the 
constitutional challenge to the FAA testing program); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.  
 261  Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457; see also discussion infra Part IV.   
 262  HB-597, supra note 5.  
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to all hospitals throughout the state.263  Specifically, the PPSA suggested 
that physicians be drug tested according to the FAA testing regulations 
and cross-referenced the DOT procedures for testing employees in the 
transportation sectors that are subject to federal regulation.264  The 
FAA program aims to test employees pre-employment, randomly, 
following an adverse event, upon a reasonable suspicion of 
impairment, when an employee returns to duty, and to follow-up with 
the employee’s progress once he rejoins the workforce.265 
The DOT testing program is very careful about respecting 
employee privacy: for example, the regulations require that the 
collector of the sample not be able to link the employee with his 
sample, result, or report.266  Also, under 49 C.F.R. § 40.61, test 
administrators are prohibited from asking the employee to list the 
medications he is currently taking.267  Section 40.41 states that the 
preferred type of testing facility is a single-toilet room with a full-length 
door or a multi-stall restroom that provides “substantial visual 
privacy.”268  Likewise, the policy requires that breathalyzer tests be 
administered in a way that provides the employee “visual and aural 
privacy” from others besides the test administrator and a DOT agency 
representative.269  Further, both the urinalysis and breathalyzer tests 
require a confirmatory test upon a positive result for either 
substance.270  Finally, the DOT procedures prohibit an employer from 
releasing an employee’s results or medical information without the 
latter’s “specific written consent.”271 
The regulations, then, set out a minimally intrusive method of 
testing by not requiring direct observation or disclosure of medical 
information until a positive result is confirmed, two factors that 
weighed toward a finding of constitutionality in Von Raab,272 and by 
 
 263  Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4.   
 264  49 C.F.R. § 40 (2016).  While the FAA specifies its own rules for aviation 
employees under 14 C.F.R. § 120, it belongs to a group of federal agencies that are 
governed by the DOT and thus largely refers to the DOT’s own provisions.  DOT Agency 
Information, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.dot.gov/odapc/agencies (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2016).  
 265  49 C.F.R. § 40.14(h).  
 266  Id. § 40.31(d).  
 267  Id. § 40.61(g). 
 268  Id. § 40.41(e), (f).  
 269  Id. § 40.221. 
 270  See id. § 40.253 for alcohol testing and id. § 40.87 for drug testing.  
 271  49 C.F.R. § 40.321.  
 272  Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660 n.2 (1989).  
Moreover, the DOT regulations only permit a direct observation in select instances, 
such as when an employee shows intent to, or does, tamper with the sample, or is 
HALAT (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2016  12:55 PM 
976 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:939 
providing testing facilities similar to public restrooms, which the Acton 
Court looked upon favorably.273 
Similarly, the FAA regulations,274 which served as the model for 
the PPSA program, require a full range of testing of all employees in 
safety-sensitive positions:275 pre-employment, random, post-accident, 
reasonable cause, return to duty, and follow-up testing.276  The FAA 
regulations, however, have a more detailed scheme for alcohol testing 
than the DOT regulations.  While all safety-sensitive employees are 
tested for alcohol,277 certain employees are prohibited from working 
with a BAC over 0.04 and from drinking within eight hours of 
performing their duties.278 
In terms of sanctions, 49 C.F.R. § 40.191 provides that a failure to 
“cooperate with any part of the testing process,” even failing to empty 
one’s pockets, constitutes a refusal to take a test and triggers 
consequences such as suspension from work.279  Specifically, 14 C.F.R. 
§§ 120.11, 120.13, and 120.15 state that pilots, flight crewmembers, and 
other airmen are subject to drug testing, and their refusal to test results 
in a denied certificate or rating application, or license suspension or 
revocation.280 
Further, the FAA provides strict consequences for positive test 
results.  Under 14 C.F.R. § 120.111, an employee with two positive drug 
test results is permanently disqualified from performing “the safety-
sensitive duties [he] performed prior to the second drug test.”281  If a 
test result demonstrates that an employee performed such a duty while 
impaired, his employer will also permanently disqualify him from that 
 
subject to return-to-duty or follow-up testing.  49 C.F.R. § 40.67.  Such an observation 
is done without advance notice to the employee, ensuring the effectiveness of the 
testing, unlike in Chandler, and gives collectors little discretion to require such testing 
on their own.  Id.; Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 326 (1997).   
 273  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995).   
 274  14 C.F.R. § 120 (2016).  
 275 Industry Drug and Alcohol Testing Program, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/aam/drug
_alcohol/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).  
 276  14 C.F.R. §§ 120.109, 120.217; see also Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 
2350.35 (requiring random, referral, and post-adverse event testing, but stating that a 
physician put on probation for impairment cannot have his license reinstated until he 
“demonstrates to the Board’s satisfaction that he or she is fit to return to duty,” 
suggesting the requirement of return-to-duty and follow-up testing to demonstrate 
such “fitness”).  
 277  14 C.F.R. §§ 120.105, 120.215.  
 278  Id. §§ 120.19(d), 120.37(d).  
 279  49 C.F.R. § 40.191 (2016).  
 280  14 C.F.R. §§ 120.11, 120.13, 120.15.   
 281  Id. § 120.111.   
HALAT (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2016  12:55 PM 
2016] COMMENT 977 
position.282  When an employee engages in alcohol-related misconduct, 
he is immediately removed from his safety-sensitive position and 
permanently disqualified following his first incident of on-duty alcohol 
use or his second violation of any alcohol-related rule under 14 C.F.R. 
§§ 120.19 or 120.37.283 
Based on this analysis, it seems that the PPSA provided a 
constitutionally reasonable test to apply to HCWs, as well as an 
adequate starting point for drafting a model testing statute.  The DOT 
policy implements safeguards for employee privacy pursuant to the 
Skinner-Von Raab line of cases, such as preferring a public restroom 
atmosphere rather than direct observation,284 ensuring that the 
collector does not know the employee,285 and testing solely for the 
presence of drugs and alcohol.286  Further, the FAA guidelines would 
adequately protect third parties from the risks posed by impaired 
physicians: the strict consequences triggered when an employee is 
found to be under the influence at work supply a promising deterrent 
for HCWs, and the immediate removal of such an employee 
satisfactorily ensures patient safety.  Accordingly, although the PPSA 
failed to become law, its proposed adoption of the FAA regulations for 
testing physicians seems to be an appropriate fit, and the model testing 
program would do well to adopt the FAA, or any other DOT-based, 
drug testing regulations. 
2. Random Testing Is a Necessary Component of Any 
Model Testing Statute 
Although this form of testing has proved most controversial, 
random testing is indispensable to an effective testing program.287  The 
medical field is, and has been, self-regulating,288 and a desire to remain 
self-regulating is understandable because only HCWs can understand 
 
 282  Id.  
 283  Id. § 120.221.  
 284  Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660 n.2 (1989).  
 285  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626–27 (1989) (explaining that 
the railroad’s test is minimally intrusive because the sample was collected “by 
personnel unrelated to the railroad employer,” making it “not unlike similar 
procedures encountered” when getting an annual physical).  
 286  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626. 
 287  Ejnes, supra note 19, at 912 (“Despite our professional obligation to report 
impaired colleagues, we have been reluctant to do so.  Thus, as advocated by others, 
effective programs to detect and prevent physician impairment may require a limited 
amount of mandatory drug and alcohol testing.”).  
 288  Pham & Provonost, supra note 232 (“Traditionally, impaired physicians are 
identified through self-policing of professional norms, with impaired physicians 
identifying themselves or being identified by their colleagues.”).  
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“the complexity of medical tasks,” the nature of their work, and the 
standards to which such professionals should be held.289  On the other 
hand, because HCWs understand so well the stress and the years of 
hard work, they may be more forgiving of their colleagues who fall prey 
to addiction or even those who sometimes come to work intoxicated.290  
Consequently, thirty-three percent of physicians fail to report their 
colleagues,291 which is “something of an embarrassment” to the 
profession and entirely unacceptable to the public.292  Further, where 
physician health programs do exist, they may be less proactive than 
they should be in detecting impaired physicians, which means, “by 
default, that patient harm has to occur before a review process occurs,” 
and often, “an overwhelming amount of data (i.e., harmed patients) 
must be available before a hospital or state initiates an investigation.”293 
Perhaps, then, it is time to break from the status quo and adopt 
another method of regulation.  While testing in other forms (based on 
a random suspicion, following an adverse event, etc.) is necessary, it 
would not be sufficient to ensure patient safety.  For example, relying 
on referrals from colleagues to test an employee is simply ineffective 
due to the culture of silence in the medical field, which prevents 
physicians from reporting an impaired doctor.294 
Relying on a reasonable suspicion alone to test employees for 
drugs and/or alcohol would be ineffective because of the discretion 
inherent in such a judgment.  The DOT regulations allow employers 
to test upon a reasonable suspicion, which is defined as a supervisor’s 
“determination based upon specific, contemporaneous, articulable 
observations concerning the employee’s appearance, behavior, 
speech, or body [odors]” that lead him to believe the employee is 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol.295  Because this type of testing 
depends on the supervisor’s determination, influenced by his meager 
two hours of training (sixty minutes of training each for the indicators 
 
 289  Matthew K. Wynia, The Role of Professionalism and Self-Regulation in Detecting 
Impaired or Incompetent Physicians, JAMA, July 14, 2010, at 210, 210.  
 290  Pham & Provonost, supra note 232, at 913–14 (“Physicians are often reticent to 
identify their colleagues, even in the face of clear evidence of impairment or abuse.”).  
 291  Cynthia A. Lien, A Need to Establish Programs to Detect and Prevent Drug Diversion, 
MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS, July 2012, at 607, 607.  
 292  Abramson et al., supra note 6, at 12 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 293  Pham et al., supra note 232, at 2101.  
 294  Pham & Provonost, supra note 232, 913–14.  
 295  OFFICE OF DRUG AND ALCOHOL POLICY AND COMPLIANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
DOT AGENCY/USCG DRUG AND ALCOHOL PROGRAM FACTS 5, http://www.dot.gov/ 
sites/dot.dev/files/docs/ODAPC_Program%20Facts.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).   
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of alcohol use and drug use),296 it is largely discretionary.  If the 
supervisor chooses to turn a blind eye or misses a sign of impairment, 
the employee simply will not be tested under this program.297 
For example, most of the facilities that employed Kwiatkowski had 
suspicion-based testing policies: at least one of them, the University of 
Pittsburgh Medical Center, actually tested Kwiatkowski, but still did not 
inform the ultimate authority responsible for his licensure, the 
ARRT.298  On the other hand, New Hampshire’s Exeter Hospital never 
tested Kwiatkowski, even though his colleagues repeatedly told 
supervisors that he seemed “overly medicated” and was seen with white 
foam around his mouth.299  Instead, the extent of the hospital’s 
disciplinary action was sending him home for the day and recording 
these behaviors in his personnel file.300 
Pre-employment testing alone will not suffice to deter medical 
professionals from substance abuse because they will anticipate the 
test.  Such tests condition a HCW’s employment on a negative drug 
test, giving the prospective employees notice and an opportunity to 
find a way to avoid detection.  Employees could abstain from their drug 
or alcohol use for the necessary period of time to allow the substance 
to leave their system,301 dilute their urine and/or use the urine of 
another individual, or use a product available on the market to assure 
a negative result.302  While such testing at least weeds out the employees 
 
 296  KUO & ASSOCS., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REASONABLE SUSPICION REFERRAL FOR 
DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING: A TRAINING PROGRAM FOR TRANSIT SUPERVISORS 3 (1997), 
http://transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov/publications/safety/ReasonableSuspicion/ 
PDF/rf-leader.pdf.  
 297  Abramson et al., supra note 6, at 14; see also Roger S. Cicala, Substance Abuse 
Among Physicians: What You Need to Know, HOSP. PHYSICIAN, July 2003, at 39, 42–43, 
http://www.turner-white.com/pdf/hp_jul03_know.pdf (explaining that the 
indicators of substance abuse among HCWs vary based on the substance abused: if the 
HCW has access to the drug through work, he maintains his work performance at a 
high level so as to stay near the drug, but works alone, taking frequent bathroom 
breaks and often closing doors to the rooms he occupies; conversely, the HCW who 
abuses drugs obtained through other avenues will make work his last priority, leaving 
early, coming in late, and taking extended lunch hours).  
 298  Abramson et al., supra note 6, at 11.  
 299  Id. at 12 (quotation marks omitted).  
 300  Id.  
 301 Approximate Detection Times, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayomedical 
laboratories.com/articles/drug-book/viewall.html (last updated Nov. 2015).  Based 
on this chart, it is possible for an employee to avoid detection by abstaining from drug 
use for a short time before the urinalysis: for example, cocaine and LSD leave the 
system in less than one day.  Id.  
 302  Medical School Drug Testing is a Moral and Scientific Failure, KEVINMD (May 11, 
2014), http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2014/05/medical-school-drug-testing-moral-
scientific-failure.html.  
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who are so addicted that they cannot even abstain for a test that they 
know is coming, the data regarding currently practicing impaired 
medical workers303 suggests that pre-employment testing does not 
capture enough of the harm-doers. 
Testing following an adverse event, by definition, means waiting 
until a patient is injured before stepping in to protect patients more 
generally.  For example, the California Health and Safety Code 
includes within its definition of “adverse event”: performing surgery on 
the wrong patient; death or disability associated with using a device in 
patient care in a way it is not intended to be used; and death or 
disability associated with giving a patient the wrong dosage of a drug.304  
Another disadvantage of relying solely on adverse event testing is the 
danger of a false positive—a doctor may have had a drink at a social 
function after rendering his services, or a nurse may be unable to 
provide a sample because he has left for vacation.  Will either of these 
professionals be penalized for their post-work activities, the doctor for 
his positive breathalyzer test or the nurse for his “refusal” to provide a 
test sample?  If so, would medical professionals be forced to schedule 
work around their social plans to avoid being caught in such a 
predicament?305 
Finally, return-to-duty and follow-up testing are necessary because 
they take place after an employee has already failed or refused to take 
a prior test.306  Unfortunately, because these tests are not administered 
until after an employee has already violated the testing regulations 
(either by failing a test or by being noncompliant), they do not have as 
much of a deterrent or preventative-measure value as random testing. 
Based on an analysis of the range of testing available, random 
testing provides a different kind of benefit, and as such, needs to be 
 
 303  See discussion supra Part III. 
 304  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1279.1(b)(1)(B), (2)(B), (4)(A) (Deering 2016); 
see also Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.15(b) (adopting the definition 
of “adverse event” set out in the California Health and Safety Code).   
 305  Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.24(A)(2) (requiring a doctor to 
be tested within 12 hours of an adverse event if he treated the patient 24 hours before 
the event, necessarily limiting the operative period to 36 hours); see also Levin, supra 
note 14 (stating that Richard Thorp, president of the California Medical Association, 
explained: 
“[A]n adverse event may not come to light for days or even weeks after 
a patient received care.  That means that a drug test would not reveal 
anything about whether the doctor in question was under the influence 
while on duty.  It could also be difficult for doctors to provide immediate 
urine samples if they are traveling or on vacation . . . .”). 
 306  An Employer’s Guide to Drug Testing in Montana, MONT. DEP’T OF LABOR AND 
INDUS., http://wsd.dli.mt.gov/service/drugmanuala.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).  
HALAT (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2016  12:55 PM 
2016] COMMENT 981 
included in any health care testing program.  Because medical 
professionals have no way of knowing, down to the day, when their test 
will be, they are not as prepared to avoid the test or alter their results, 
offering employees an incentive to avoid using drugs or alcohol and 
offering employers a more effective way to pick out the employees who 
may be harming patients.  Further, because there is no discretion 
involved with random testing, this form of testing will presumably yield 
a more accurate reading of the medical workforce because supervisors 
will not be able to turn a blind eye to a positive result, and there is no 
need to rely on the referrals of colleagues who prefer to not get 
involved.  Lastly, some have argued that random testing is an ethical 
necessity because it fills in the gaps, left by other forms of testing, in a 
health care institution’s ethical obligation to detect substance abusers 
while avoiding the “double standards and stigmata” of suspicion-based 
and pre-employment testing.307 
C. All Health Care Workers Must Be Tested 
Had the PPSA been enacted, it would have subjected all holders 
of a physician and surgeon’s certificate to testing.308  According to the 
California Business and Professions Code, a “holder” of a physician 
and surgeon’s certificate may prescribe medication, use devices in or 
upon a person, and/or perform surgery that would sever or penetrate 
human tissue.309  Thus, even specialists in fields that generally do not 
require particularly risky procedures, such as dermatologists and 
podiatrists, would have been subject to testing. 
Podiatrists treat a variety of foot-related problems by prescribing 
drugs, setting fractures, and performing surgery.310  Some states even 
license podiatrists to prescribe narcotics to treat foot conditions, to be 
administered “by any route, including intravenously,” even though 
“any medications prescribed may also have other systemic effects on 
the patient.”311  The fact that a podiatrist is able to operate on a patient 
and prescribe him medication alone creates the risk that an impaired 
podiatrist can seriously harm a patient.  What is more, an unlicensed 
assistant at the podiatrist’s side “cannot provide any service which 
constitutes the practice of podiatry” and in fact is monitored by the 
 
 307  Levine & Rennie, supra note 3, at 323.  
 308  Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.15(E).  
 309  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2051 (Deering 2016).  
 310 Podiatry Department: The Profession of Podiatry, BOULDER MED. CENTER, 
https://www.bouldermedicalcenter.com/depts/podiatry.php (last visited Feb. 15, 
2016).  
 311  Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP’T, OFFICE OF THE PROFS., 
http://www.op.nysed.gov/prof/pod/podfaq.htm (last updated May 12, 2015).  
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podiatrist while in the office.312  Thus, if the podiatrist himself is under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol, it seems as if the assistant will be of 
little help to the patient. 
Likewise, dermatologists treat skin-related problems by 
prescribing medication, diagnosing certain ailments, and performing 
minor surgery.  For instance, when a dermatologist diagnoses skin 
cancer, he may excise the “cancer and a small amount of normal-
looking skin” surrounding it, and typically performs the procedure 
right in his office,313 putting the patient in harm’s way if the 
dermatologist is impaired.  Furthermore, dermatologists as a group 
have generated about 86 to 123 claims of malpractice per year, ranging 
from medication errors to “failure to recognize a complication of 
treatment.”314 
Therefore, though there is less danger to life when doctors who 
do not typically perform invasive procedures—such as dermatologists 
and podiatrists—err, because the nature of their practice is less 
surgically demanding, the need to test these kinds of doctors is still 
strong.  Specialized physicians could still prescribe patients the wrong 
kind of medication, or misdiagnose or fail to diagnose a serious 
condition.  Further, while these doctors devote a minimal percentage 
of their time to procedures that can immediately impact a patient, that 
small amount of time, as the Derwinski court recognized,315 is not 
insignificant.  Thus, a model testing policy for HCWs would include all 
types of doctors. 
Moreover, the ideal testing program would not be limited to 
doctors because such a program would exclude nurses, medical 
technicians, and other HCWs who can harm patients.  Courts have 
recognized this risk.  In Kemp, the Southern District of Mississippi 
upheld the testing of a scrub nurse because she held a safety-sensitive 
position by providing “direct, hands-on patient care, including 
bringing the patient from the hospital room to the operating room for 
surgery and being present and assisting during surgery.”316  The district 
court found that despite her not wielding a surgical instrument, a 
scrub tech could cause the patient “irremediable harm” by allowing 
 
 312  Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 313  Columbus Skin Cancer Treatment, UNIVERSAL DERMATOLOGY AND VEIN CARE, 
https://universaldermatology.com/medical-services/skin-cancer/ (last visited Feb. 
15, 2016).  
 314  Patient Safety, AM. ACAD. OF DERMATOLOGY, http://www.aad.org/education/ 
patient-safety (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).  
 315  Am. Fed’n of Gov’t. Emps. L-2110 v. Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. 1493, 1498 (N.D. 
Cal. 1991).  
 316  Kemp v. Claiborne Cty. Hosp., 763 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (S.D. Miss. 1991).  
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the patient to fall from a gurney, by bumping the surgeon “at a critical 
moment during the surgery,” or by failing to properly count surgical 
sponges.317  Similarly, the Derwinski court found the drug testing 
constitutional as applied to medical professionals across the board—
physicians, pharmacists, nurses, and medical technicians—even if they 
spent “five percent or less of [their] time” directly interacting with 
patients.318 
Finally, the cases of Mr. Kwiatkowski, Ms. Parker, and Mr. 
Beumel319 make clear that nearly any employee in an operating room 
or doctor’s office could harm a patient.  As such, the New Hampshire 
legislature was justified in proposing to test “all health care workers 
employed” in state-licensed facilities.320 
D. Consequences Should Be Swift, Yet Appropriate 
Thanks to the public debate occasioned by Proposition 46, it has 
become clear that the medical field needs to change its approach to 
regulating its professionals.321  While most of the necessary reform is 
beyond the scope of this Comment, it is beneficial to note some of the 
suggestions made by others in the face of the failed PPSA and HB-597. 
One of the biggest critiques of Proposition 46 is that it was just too 
strict: many people believed that the purpose of the act was to punish, 
rather than identify and rehabilitate, the impaired doctors.322  While 
our instinct may be to lock up dangerous doctors, such an approach 
may actually have the opposite effect on patient safety by feeding into 
the culture of silence—if doctors face harsh consequences, colleagues 
 
 317  Id. at 1367–68.  
 318  Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. at 1498.  
 319  Levinson & Broadhust, supra note 87. 
 320  HB-597, supra note 5.  
 321  Although medicine is a self-regulating profession, relying on state medical 
boards to license and discipline physicians, colleagues are mum when it comes to 
blowing the whistle, and bureaucratic boards are slow to move their feet.  See John 
Leifer, Who Is Protecting Us from Bad Doctors?, THE LEIFER REPORT (Oct. 16, 2014), 
http://leiferreport.com/protecting-bad-doctors/ (stating that, “according to 
[Inspector General] Alan Levine, who provides oversight of the medical boards on 
behalf of the United States,” many medical boards “serve the vested interest of 
physicians to a far greater extent than they serve the public good” by under-
disciplining physicians, if at all).  
 322  Pham & Provonost, supra note 232.  One reason the PPSA seems more punitive 
than rehabilitative is because California is one of the few states without a Physician 
Health Program (PHP).  See id. at 914; see also Sigrid Bathen, Doctors’ Drug Tests: A 
Divisive Issue, CAPITOL WEEKLY (Oct. 19, 2014), http://capitolweekly.net/ 
drug-testing-doctors-prop-46-california7636/ (explaining that California’s PHP was 
shut down in 2008 when audits revealed “major flaws,” such as allowing participants to 
provide false urine samples to finish the program and return to practice).  
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will be less likely to make referrals, and impaired physicians themselves 
will try harder to hide their substance abuse.323 
A second critique of the PPSA focuses on its lack of specificity.  
The Act did not explain how doctors would be chosen for random 
testing, “leaving the door open for less-than-random selection,” which 
is “of particular concern given the increasingly competitive business 
environment” of the medical field.324  Similarly, the PPSA stated that 
doctors would be drug tested at hospitals, but did not specify whether 
the hospital’s medical staff or its administration would be in charge of 
testing.325  Accordingly, should a state enact a statute to test HCWs, it 
should specify these details.  For example, when Massachusetts General 
Hospital began drug testing all members of its anesthesiology 
department in 2008,326 it tested residents twice per year during their 
first year of employment, and at least once per year for their second 
and third years at the hospital.327  The Massachusetts hospital later 
reported the program’s success in deterring drug use among its 100 
employees.328  Conversely, the original HB-597 proposed to drug test 
all HCWs four times per year.329  Perhaps, at least initially, a state might 
aim to emulate the successful Massachusetts program, especially if 
employers are concerned about the cost of administering such tests.330 
A final criticism of Proposition 46, and perhaps of drug testing 
physicians more generally, is the damage caused by false positives and 
faulty referrals, especially in a state with a slow-moving medical 
board.331  Minsker of the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern 
California stated that the testing “could easily yield positive tests from 
legitimately prescribed drugs” and “creates a presumption of 
negligence.”332  Upon a positive test result, the state attorney general 
 
 323  Pham & Provonost, supra note 232.   
 324  Ejnes, supra note 19, at 912.  
 325  Id.  
 326  See discussion infra Part VII.  
 327  Abramson et al., supra note 6, at 13–14.  
 328  Id. at 14.  
 329  HB-597, supra note 5.  
 330  See, e.g., One State May Require Drug Tests for Hospital Workers, THE ADVISORY BD. 
CO. (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2013/02/28/one-state-
may-require-drug-tests-for-hospital-workers  (explaining that Cary Cahoon, the vice 
president of New Hampshire’s Association of Residential Care Homes, opposed the 
original HB-597 because randomly testing his thirteen workers would cost him $5700 
per year).   
 331  Elbein, supra note 84 (explaining that although six doctors and lawyers 
complained to the Texas Medical Board about Dr. Duntsch, it took the Board over a 
year to finally revoke his license—by that time, Duntsch had killed two patients and 
paralyzed four through his “surgical misadventures”).  
 332  Levin, supra note 14.  
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would temporarily suspend the doctor’s license pending an 
investigation, during which time the physician could not practice and 
his patients would not be treated.333  Moreover, “the Act d[id] not 
specify a time frame for an investigation and hearing to determine 
whether the physician was impaired,” potentially holding doctors in 
limbo for an unreasonable amount of time.334  Finally, Richard Thorp, 
president of the California Medical Association, spoke out against the 
consequences of failing to submit to a test: according to the PPSA, if a 
doctor does not submit to a test within the required period, he could 
have his license suspended, which Thorp argues is “overreaching and 
so draconian.”335 
While these critiques are valid, one aspect of the PPSA with which 
it is difficult to argue is the swift removal of a doctor from duty upon a 
confirmed positive drug test.  Through its reference to the DOT 
regulations, the PPSA called for the confirmatory testing of a provided 
sample and analysis by a Medical Review Officer of the sample and the 
employee’s medical and prescription information to increase the 
chance that the result is not a false positive.336  Adding such safeguards 
would help protect doctors from the damage to their reputation of a 
false positive while keeping the public safe. 
E. Relying on a Drug Test Alone Is Not Enough to Ensure Patient Safety 
Drug testing HCWs by itself will not keep patients safe.  All a drug 
test can do is identify an impaired HCW and remove him from his 
duties for a period of time.  But what happens when that period expires 
and the still-addicted HCW is able to return to work?  While such a 
situation can be dangerous with any HCW, if the employee is one with 
access to drugs at work, he could be returning to the most dangerous 
place for him to be—a place where he can harm both himself and his 
patients.337  Furthermore, if substance abuse is a result of the HCW’s 
 
 333  Ejnes, supra note 19, at 911–12.  
 334  Id.  
 335  Levin, supra note 14 (internal quotation marks omitted); but see Johnson, supra 
note 49 (explaining that for Dr. A. Clark Gaither, who had long struggled with a 
drinking problem, the temporary loss of his license was necessary to finally set him on 
the path to sobriety after a failed intervention in medical school and an unsuccessful 
attempt at mandatory treatment during his residency program).  
 336  This sort of procedure is included in 49 C.F.R. § 40.123 (2016).  
 337  Lauren Cox, Urine Drug Tests for Doctors? After Decades of Unchanging Addiction 
Rates, Some Anesthesiology Departments Are Using Drug Testing, ABC NEWS MED. UNIT (Nov. 
12, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/PainManagement/print?id 
=6232694 (describing a study by the Cleveland Clinic Foundation in Ohio, which 
revealed that “80 percent of anesthesiology residency training programs reported 
problems with drug-impaired doctors, and an additional 19 percent reported a death 
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self-medication for his job-induced stress, we owe it to that doctor to 
provide him treatment to save his life. 
For this reason, opponents emphasize the need for rehabilitation 
programs, like Physician Health Programs (PHPs), through which 
HCWs can receive treatment for their addiction, attend group therapy, 
and be monitored when they return to work.338  Most states have PHPs, 
and studies reporting the effectiveness of such programs boast success 
rates as high as eighty or ninety percent.339  PHPs offer a variety of 
services, such as “disease management, support, long-term monitoring 
of illness and treatment efforts, advocacy, [and] help with fulfilling 
reporting requirements.”340  Further, a 2008 study of 800 physicians 
who had recently completed such programs found that after five years, 
sixty-five percent of the subjects remained drug- and/or alcohol-free.341  
For PHPs to be successful, however, they need to be confidential to 
encourage professionals to both turn themselves in and/or refer their 
colleagues.  Without this promise of privacy, the stigma of substance 
abuse will keep away HCWs who truly need treatment.342 
Likewise, these types of program need to begin earlier.  Medical 
schools need to educate their students on the dangers of substance use 
and abuse, since “[f]or many physicians, substance abuse begins early 
during medical school and residency.”343  Moreover, medical schools 
should test students to prevent recreational drug use from turning into 
a crippling addiction.  While some schools already feature testing,344 
 
from overdose”); see also Seppala & Berge, supra note 80, at 4 (explaining the high 
death rate among anesthesiologists and the recommendations that, when these 
physicians return to work following treatment, they be kept out of the operating room, 
where they would “have to handle on a daily basis the very drugs to which they were 
addicted”).  
 338  Seppala & Berge, supra note 80, at 3–4.  
 339  Bathen, supra note 322.  
 340  Seppala & Berge, supra note 80, at 3.   
 341  SCIENTIFIC AM., supra note 88.  Of course, this means that one in three doctors 
relapse, suggesting that these programs either need to be revamped and/or that 
employers need to more diligently monitor employees returning from PHPs.  Id.  
 342  Bathen, supra note 322 (“All the doctors insist that [the program] must be secret 
and confidential, otherwise no doctor will go into it . . . .”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 343  Marie R. Baldisseri, Impaired Healthcare Professional, 35 CRIT. CARE. MED., no. 2, 
2007, at S106, S109 http://www.csam-asam.org/sites/default/files/pdf/misc/ 
16_article_Baldisseri_Impaired_healthcare_prof_2007.pdf.  
 344  See, e.g., Alcohol and Other Drug Policy, COLUM. UNIV. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS AND 
SURGEONS, http://ps.columbia.edu/education/academics/policies/alcohol-policy 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (requiring ten-panel drug test prior to students beginning 
a clinical program); Background Check and Drug Testing, HERBERT WERTHEIM COLL. OF 
MED., http://www.medicine.fiu.edu/admissions/md/background-check/index.html 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (explaining that all students are subject to a ten-panel drug 
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more schools should adopt such procedures.345  Further, HCWs must 
learn, through school or otherwise, how to identify an impaired 
individual and the importance of identifying such people.346  Although 
HCWs are under an obligation to report impaired colleagues, they 
often fail to do so.347 
Finally, the medical field needs a more protective whistleblower 
law.  Despite their moral, legal, and ethical obligations to report 
colleagues they know to be impaired, HCWs fail to carry out that duty 
because of the culture of silence and the threat to their careers of 
turning in a fellow medical professional.348  If a state enacting a law to 
drug test HCWs likewise adopts a statute to protect those who report 
their colleagues, the testing law may be more effective.349 
VII. THE DOWNSIDE OF TESTING HEALTH CARE WORKERS 
While this Comment mainly focuses on the need to test medical 
professionals for drugs and alcohol, there are some unintended 
consequences of adopting legislation calling for such testing.  Many 
believe testing will drive HCWs out of the medical field, or at least limit 
their practice areas, not only because of the fear of getting caught (the 
intended consequence), but also because testing might: 1) make it 
more dangerous to perform certain procedures; 2) make it too 
expensive to practice medicine generally; 3) be degrading to medical 
employees; and 4) be ineffective. 
 
 
screen and alcohol test “prior to the beginning of first year classes”); Background Checks 
and Drug Testing, SUNY DOWNSTATE MED. CTR., http://sls.downstate.edu/ 
student_affairs/CBCDT.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (explaining that students 
must take, and pay for, a ten-panel drug test before being enrolled in certain elective 
clinics).  
 345  Medical schools should test their students because drug use and addiction can 
begin in the school and clinical settings.  See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 49 (explaining 
that Dr. A. Clark Gaither struggled with addiction throughout medical school and his 
residency program); see also Elbein, supra note 94 (noting that Dr. Duntsch was 
allegedly treated for drug abuse while a resident at the University of Tennessee).  
 346  See Seppala & Berge, supra note 80, at 2 (explaining that HCWs may be hesitant 
to talk to and/or report a colleague because “medical schools provide little, if any, 
training in how to recognize and treat addiction,” so “the vast majority of primary care 
physicians are unable to recognize” the indicators of abuse and/or addiction in a 
colleague).  
 347  Ejnes, supra note 19, at 912 (“Our efforts to date to address [impairment] have 
fallen short and are for the most part reactive.  Despite our professional obligation to 
report impaired colleagues, we have been reluctant to do so.”).  
 348  Baldisseri, supra note 343, at S111.   
 349  Bathen, supra note 322 (explaining Dr. Gregory Skipper’s belief that a “snitch 
law” is necessary to encourage physicians to report their colleagues by providing them 
protection from liability).  
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Some opponents claim that drug testing after an adverse event 
will force HCWs out of the riskier areas of medicine.  For example, will 
testing lead to a decrease in aides in nursing homes or prevent a 
surgeon from operating on particularly vulnerable patients?  Perhaps, 
but it should be noted that certain states, like California, when dealing 
with deaths or injuries not caused directly by the HCW’s negligence, 
limit “adverse events” to the death or injury of otherwise healthy 
patients.350  Thus, it is possible that the state adopting drug testing for 
HCWs already has, or will implement, these provisions in its statutes. 
Another view shared by opponents is that drug testing will make 
practicing medicine generally too expensive, forcing HCWs to leave 
the field due to cost.351  One response to this critique is the approach 
taken by Proposition 46, which would have required doctors 
themselves to pay for the tests and would have increased licensing fees 
to enable the state medical boards to administer the tests and 
investigate allegations of substance abuse.352  While this approach 
seems to put all of the cost on doctors, drug testing may decrease 
medical errors, and in turn, the cost of medical malpractice 
litigation,353 making these tests and fees affordable for doctors. 
A third argument is that drug testing HCWs would be unethical 
and degrading because of the cultural status of medical professionals 
in our country and the invasion of privacy accompanying such tests.  
Proponents would respond to this argument by pointing out that drug 
and/or alcohol testing, whether by breath, urine, or blood tests, have 
been upheld by courts for safety-sensitive employees, a class to which 
HCWs belong.354  Accordingly, if the invasion of privacy does not 
render the testing of teachers and pilots unreasonable,355 the same 
would be true for HCWs.  Likewise, if testing is not unethical for other 
safety-sensitive employees, it could not be morally objectionable to test 
 
 350  See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1279.1 (Deering 2016) (recognizing 
deaths and injuries resulting from “[r]etention of a foreign object,” “contamination 
[that] is the result of generally detectable contaminants,” and use of a device that is 
“other than as intended” as adverse events, but excluding deaths or injuries of high-
risk patients, such as those: “associated with neurosurgical procedures known to 
present a high risk of intravascular air embolism;” “from pulmonary or amniotic fluid 
embolism, acute fatty liver of pregnancy, or cardiomyopathy;” and “resulting from self-
inflicted injuries that were the reason for admission to the health facility”).   
 351  THE ADVISORY BD. CO., supra note 330.   
 352  Ejnes, supra note 19.   
 353  CAL. ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 26.  
 354  See supra Part IV. 
 355  Knox Cty. Educ. Ass’n v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 384 (6th Cir. 
1998); Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451, 457–58 (9th Cir. 1990).  
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medical professionals.356 
Finally, opponents argue that drug testing is largely ineffective, so 
those in the medical field should not be subjected to it.  Such an 
argument is unconvincing because the same rates of effectiveness 
apply to drug testing no matter the subject of the test: if drug testing is 
so flawed, why subject only certain subsets of the safety-sensitive class 
of employees to testing and exempt others, like HCWs?357  
Furthermore, some hospitals have instituted random drug testing for 
their employees in recent years and have reported the success of these 
programs.358  For instance, in 2005, Massachusetts General Hospital 
began randomly testing all 100 employees of its Department of 
Anesthesia and Critical Care at least twice in their first year of 
residency, and at least once during their second and third years.359  The 
program also randomly tested “[s]taff anesthesiologists and nurse 
anesthetists . . . within six months of their biannual reappointment.”360  
The Massachusetts hospital found that, “[s]ince the institution of th[e] 
program, there have been no reported cases of drug abuse” in its 
anesthesiology residency program.361 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Based on drug testing precedent, HCWs are an appropriate class 
of employees to constitutionally test for drugs and alcohol.  Not only is 
the government’s interest in testing HCWs significant due to the rate 
of substance abuse within the profession and its safety-sensitive nature, 
but these professionals also have a diminished expectation of privacy 
by virtue of being in a highly regulated field.  Further, the guideposts 
advanced in this Comment—reflecting aspects of programs upheld by 
courts, of provisions mentioned in proposed legislation, and of 
suggested reforms from those within and outside of the medical field—
are minimally intrusive and respect HCWs’ privacy by keeping results 
confidential and reducing the discretion administrators have in 
 
 356  Pham & Provonost, supra note 232, at 914 (“Most other professions that have 
the potential to harm others already require routine testing.  There is no ethical 
justification for excluding physicians from such testing.”).  
 357  KEVINMD, supra note 302 (arguing that drug testing is not necessary because if 
the objective is to prevent addicts from becoming doctors, the rigors of medical school 
already accomplish that aim); but see Elbein, supra note 94 (explaining that Dr. 
Duntsch abused drugs throughout medical school and went on to practice as a 
neurosurgeon); see also Baldisseri, supra note 343, at S109.   
 358  Abramson et al., supra note 6, at 13–14.  
 359  Id.   
 360  Id. at 14.  
 361  Id.  
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carrying out the program.  While the suggested program proposes to 
test all HCWs, such a broad application is warranted based on the 
dangers inherent in any sort of patient treatment, no matter the 
degree of actual physical contact. 
Although adopting such legislation may risk some negative 
consequences, such as scaring medical employees away from certain 
types of procedures or making it more expensive to practice medicine 
generally, the advantages of testing HCWs far outweigh the 
disadvantages.  For years, different sectors of society have called for the 
random drug testing of medical employees, and for years, such 
provisions have been put off.  Despite reliance on self-regulation and 
PHPs, the rate of substance abuse among HCWs is not subsiding, and 
a change is necessary to protect patients.  While the medical field may 
have to pay the price of relinquishing some control and perhaps 
expending more money to monitor professionals, the result is a 
healthier and more reliable profession, and as such, greater safety for 
patients. 
Upon graduating medical school, doctors take the Hippocratic 
Oath and swear to uphold the following statements: “[m]ost especially 
must I tread with care in matters of life and death . . . . I will remember 
that I remain a member of society, with special obligations to all my 
fellow human beings . . . .”362  A random drug test a few times per year 
can be instrumental in saving lives, and it is surely a facet of the “special 
obligations” those in the health care profession hold to their fellow 
human beings. 
 
 
 362  Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, NOVA (Mar. 27, 2001), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html.  
